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# The role of social capital in racial differences in lawyer success

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## THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LAWYER SUCCESS

by

## Kevin Damone Pinkston

# An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

May 2013

Thesis Supervisor: Adjunct Associate Professor Mary Campbell

#### ABSTRACT

The problem of the black-white gross earnings gap is near its largest amongst lawyers; blacks earn a significantly lower income than whites (Dinovitzer et al. 2004; Grodsky and Pager 2001). There is also a white advantage in overall job satisfaction amongst lawyers (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010; Dau-Schmidt and Mukhopadhaya 1999). This study examines how social capital contributes to racial differences in these two aspects of overall job success. Social capital theories hypothesize that more social capital leads to increased job status attainment (Lin et al. 1981; Lin 2001). Blacks receive fewer and lower paying jobs than whites, perhaps in part because of a lack of social capital in their lower status and segregated social networks (Braddock and McPartland 1987; Elliot 1999; although see Mouw (2003) for a challenge which showed little to no effect of the use of contacts on earnings). Similarly, Ducharme and Martin (2000) found that social relationships with co-workers increase overall job satisfaction.

This project specifically examines social capital in the attorney job market, because this is a specific job market in which there are strong theoretical reasons to expect social capital to affect wages and job satisfaction. Using Portes' (1998) definition of social capital, the ability to secure benefits from one's social networks, I distinguish between three major social networks (professional, non-professional, and kinship), and then derive hypotheses about their effect on earnings and job satisfaction. The main hypothesis is that black and white differences in professional and non-professional networks account for part of the earnings and job satisfaction inequality between blacks and whites. The study also develops competing hypotheses to test the effect of kinship networks on job satisfaction. This study takes a mixed methods approach. Nationally representative longitudinal data from the After the Juris Doctorate Survey (AJD) test the hypotheses to see if there is an effect of social capital on earnings and satisfaction.

Qualitative interviews seek to further investigate these relationships and look for emerging themes for racial differences in earnings and job satisfaction. The interviews take place with nine black and white lawyers in Chicago. The survey results reveal the significance of professional social capital networks in obtaining a higher salary among private firm attorneys. The effects of social capital do not vary across race. However, there are some black-white differences in the types of social capital used. The interview results reveal the significance of social capital in acquiring clients in small private firms, and of mentor-protégé relationships. Concluding remarks discuss the significance of professional and non-professional social capital in and beyond the legal profession, explanations for the higher levels of social capital in whites, and suggestions for ways to decrease these racial social capital disparities.

Abstract Approved:

Thesis Supervisor

Title and Department

Date

# THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LAWYER

## SUCCESS

by

Kevin Damone Pinkston

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

May 2013

Thesis Supervisor: Adjunct Associate Professor Mary Campbell

Graduate College The University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa

## CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

## PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Kevin Damone Pinkston

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology at the May 2013 graduation.

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To Henry and Mary Garnett

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The problem of the black-white gross earnings gap is near its largest amongst lawyers; blacks earn a significantly lower income than whites (Dinovitzer et al. 2004; Grodsky and Pager 2001). There is also a white advantage in overall job satisfaction amongst lawyers (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010; Dau-Schmidt and Mukhopadhaya 1999). This study examines how social capital contributes to racial differences in these two aspects of overall job success. Social capital theories hypothesize that more social capital leads to increased job status attainment (Lin et al. 1981; Lin 2001). Blacks receive fewer and lower paying jobs than whites, perhaps in part because of a lack of social capital in their lower status and segregated social networks (Braddock and McPartland 1987; Elliot 1999; although see Mouw (2003) for a challenge which showed little to no effect of the use of contacts on earnings). Similarly, Ducharme and Martin (2000) found that social relationships with co-workers increase overall job satisfaction.

This project specifically examines social capital in the attorney job market, because this is a specific job market in which there are strong theoretical reasons to expect social capital to affect wages and job satisfaction. Using Portes' (1998) definition of social capital, the ability to secure benefits from one's social networks, I distinguish between three major social networks (professional, non-professional, and kinship), and then derive hypotheses about their effect on earnings and job satisfaction. The main hypothesis is that black and white differences in professional and non-professional networks account for part of the earnings and job satisfaction inequality between blacks and whites. The study also develops competing hypotheses to test the effect of kinship networks on job satisfaction. This study takes a mixed methods approach. Nationally representative longitudinal data from the After the Juris Doctorate Survey (AJD) test the hypotheses to see if there is an effect of social capital on earnings and satisfaction.

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#### CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND RESEARCH

#### Introduction

Whites have significant employment advantages over blacks, especially in professional jobs. Earnings and job satisfaction are two of the most prominent types of advantages therein. Whites have higher average earnings than blacks, even when controlling for human capital variables such as education and work experience (Tienda and Lii 1987; Grodsky and Pager 2001). These racial gaps are actually greater for individuals with higher levels of education than for individuals with less education, after controls for important labor market determinants of wages like work experience and cognitive skills, and the gaps grow across the career (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005). Whites also report higher levels of job satisfaction than blacks (Kalleberg and Loscocco 1983; Payne-Pikus et al. 2010). Why do these gaps in earnings and job satisfaction exist?

There are several major explanations for the racial disparities in economic attainment between blacks and whites with comparable skill and experience. The discrimination explanation asserts that employers subtly discriminate against black workers and pay them lower wages. The human capital explanation describes that people tend to put less value on blacks' education and experience but more value on that of whites, or that blacks' skill levels and experience are actually lower (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005). Social capital explanations assert that blacks' social networks do not contain as many social resources as those of whites, which contributes to their lower attainment. This study will test aspects of this social capital explanation by asking three questions: 1) Does social capital have any effect on lawyers' salary and job satisfaction? 2) Does social capital account for any of the black-white discrepancy in lawyers' salary and job satisfaction? 3) If so, how much does social capital account for these black-white differences in salary and job satisfaction?

Explanations for the racial gap in job satisfaction emphasize two main influences: work values and job rewards (Kalleberg 1977). Work values refer to how much an individual values different aspects of a job, such as the relative value they place on their job being intrinsically interesting, convenient, financially rewarding, providing positive relationships with co-workers, providing chances for promotion, and having adequate resources to accomplish the job (in other words, some employees find it most important to work in a job that is interesting, while others might prioritize being well paid). Job rewards refer to the perceived level of these rewards that the job provides. Kalleberg (1977) found, using a representative dataset (the Quality Employment Survey), that blacks were significantly less satisfied with their jobs than whites and that whites perceived themselves as receiving greater job rewards than blacks in almost every different aspect of their jobs (except for convenience). Payne-Pikus et al. (2010) found that black attorneys were significantly less satisfied with their jobs than whites in large law firms. Social support from co-workers, one of the types of work values noted above, can increase job satisfaction (Hodson 1977; Ducharme and Martin 2000); this often occurs through mentoring. However, there is no research to my knowledge that simultaneously examines the effect of social relationships within the workplace as well as *outside* of the workplace on job satisfaction, as this project does, in order to get a complete picture of the effect of social capital networks on job satisfaction. For example, the long work hours that early-career attorneys often experience might lead to lowered job satisfaction most for those who do not feel they are supported in these efforts by their network of family and friends.

The current project focuses on the social capital explanation of racial differences in earnings and job satisfaction (which I refer to broadly as job success) between whites and blacks. I define social capital as the ability to access resources from one's social networks (Portes 1998). I examine the relationship between black and white social networks and job success in a whitecollar professional labor market, specifically that of lawyers. Isolating the lawyer occupation provides an effective test of the relationships between social contacts and job success because it automatically controls for education level and labor market differences. Grodsky and Pager (2001) found that the black-white earnings gap was amongst the largest with lawyers. They hypothesize this could be a result of segregated social networks and minority attorneys being assigned to less affluent minority clientele. I broaden the literature on this topic by focusing not only on earnings, but another important affective component of success, job satisfaction, which has received less attention in the social capital literature.

Another contribution of this study is further evidence for the ongoing debate on the effect of social capital on earnings. Currently there is conflicting evidence on the effect of social capital on job earnings for blacks and whites. One commonly used hypothesis is that social capital contributes more to the success of whites than blacks because blacks have social networks that are smaller in size and have a lower average socioeconomic status. This difference is said to account for part of the earnings gap between blacks and whites. Green et al. (1999) found evidence, for example, that the use of black social networks for job attainment leads to lower earnings. The competing hypothesis is that social capital has little effect on earnings. Mouw (2003) found that the use of contacts to get a job has little to no effect on the earnings of whites or blacks in nationally representative survey data. There is also a less commonly discussed third hypothesis that social capital has a stronger positive effect on job success for blacks than for whites. The argument for this is that black social networks have the ability to thwart the negative effects of race-based discrimination that would typically hinder job success in blacks. Networks could therefore create more significant relative increase in job success for blacks than whites experience (Mouw 2002), because whites generally do not face race-based discrimination. This study explores each of these hypotheses to find the effect of social capital on earnings for attorneys, a professional occupation in which earnings are often tied to recruiting clients and therefore a job where we might expect social capital to have particularly strong effects. Previous research on the effects of social capital on earnings did not use data on one occupation but rather many different occupations (Mouw 2003; Korenman and Turner 1996; Green et al. 1999), but it is possible that social networks have positive effects among high status workers who are connected to high status resources through their networks, while workers in low status jobs and social networks may be particularly likely to have negative effects from racially isolated, low status, or inner-city neighborhood networks.

In order to test these hypotheses I employ multiple methods that examine the social networks and organizational involvement of attorneys. I use data from the After the Juris Doctorate survey (AJD) to measure the nature of the social networks of lawyers and their relationship with the lawyers' clientele and earnings. In order to more deeply investigate the way these networks are used and their effects on aspects of job success, I also conduct nine in-depth interviews with lawyers in large and small firms.

The results of this study provide evidence for the significance of social capital networks within the occupation in increasing salary as well as social capital networks outside of the office in building clientele and mentoring relationships. Whites had a greater range of status in their professional social capital networks than blacks (i.e. they had more individuals with high socioeconomic status in their networks). Also, blacks are segmented into the lower paying sectors within the legal profession (Heinz and Laumann 1982) and this study finds that blacks were more likely to use methods of job acquisition that lead to a significantly decreased likelihood of working in a private firm. This finding contributes to sociological knowledge about the racial disparity in earnings among prestigious white-collar occupations, where the earnings gaps are largest (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005). Interviews further reveal the significance of being connected to high status individuals within the firm as well as differences in the keys to success between attorneys in small firms versus attorneys in large firms. Those in small firms have a greater responsibility to acquire clients even at low levels of job experience whereas those in large firms do not have a responsibility to acquire clients until they become senior partners. Also, clients in smaller firms tend to be individuals whereas those in large firms tend to be larger companies. In those smaller firms, therefore, non-professional social networks and organizational memberships have an effect on client acquisition. By demonstrating the important variation in the effects of social capital within this single occupation, this project encourages future research to examine the effect of social capital on other specific professions, such as physicians and entrepreneurs, and explores ways to increase the valuable forms of social capital. *Outline of the dissertation* 

Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides a theoretically grounded argument for the significance of social capital and summarizes the research on the effect of social networks on lawyer success. Chapter two lays out the quantitative methods of this study and presents the results from the AJD survey and their implications. Chapter three describes the qualitative interview portion of the study and outlines the emergent themes and implications of these results. The fourth and final chapter provides concluding remarks that combine the implications of the

quantitative and qualitative chapters of this project. It suggests ways to increase the size and range of social capital networks in blacks, and discusses its significance for decreasing overall economic disparities between whites and blacks in America.

### Outline of Chapter 1

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will first provide background research on the effects of social ties on earnings, followed by the effect of social ties on job satisfaction. Next, I will explain the black-white differences in the use, and composition of social networks. This chapter will go on to explicate theory on social capital, and the black-white differences therein. Finally, it will apply the social capital research to attorneys. It makes the case for the significance of social capital in determining the black-white gap in attorney salary and job satisfaction.

#### **Social Ties and Earnings**

There is a large body of sociological research on the significance of social ties. Granovetter's (1973) famous theory of the strength of weak ties was one of the first to discuss the effects of network ties on job acquisition. He argued that weak ties function as a bridge to access the benefits of other groups. In his study he interviewed a random sample of white-collar workers who changed jobs in a Boston suburb and found that of those who used contacts to find their jobs, individuals were most likely to have found their jobs through those who are not in their daily social network. In other words, individuals were more likely to have used weak ties rather than strong ties (having a strong tie is defined as spending a large amount of time, intimacy, and exchange of services with another) to find their jobs (Granovetter 1995).

Burt (1992) provides further explanation of the significance of social networks for accessing resources by describing how some networks become rich in "structural holes," when one is tied to alters (people connected to the individual of interest, called the ego) that are not

tied to one another. This increases the flow of information about more rewarding opportunities to the individual, which can increase their status. Podolny (1993; 2001) uses a metaphor of 'pipes' and 'prisms' to explain two mechanisms through which social networks can benefit individuals. According to the pipes metaphor, networks can pass information through contacts and alters. Also, individuals associated with high status others are perceived as having higher status themselves and are believed to have competence in uncertain situations, illustrating the prism effect of simply having connections to others with high status. Podolny (1993) provided evidence of the prism effect when he showed that investment banks develop syndicate relationships to display a status benchmark to increase client investment. Baum and Oliver (1992) also show that daycare centers partner up with community benchmarks to increase their legitimacy amongst prospective clientele. Networks serve as pipes and prisms to increase the flow of information and perceived legitimacy to clients in uncertain situations.

Several research projects have examined the significance of network ties for earnings and the evidence for it is mixed. Bridges and Villemez (1986) examined the effects of the strength of ties on earnings and found that tie strength used to get a job did not impact earnings when controlling for individual characteristics. They measured the strength of contacts by the frequency and duration of contact with them. Montgomery (1992) challenged Bridges and Villemez's finding that the strength of ties does not matter for earnings. He provides an extended theoretical framework arguing that an individual's reservation wage, or the lowest wage that they will accept, increases as the amount of weak ties in the network increases, therefore making network structure an important predictor of earnings. Less connected individuals who find jobs through weak contacts are likely to have lower earnings because the smaller amount of contacts decreases their reservation wage. Well-connected individuals who use weak contacts to get jobs, on the other hand, will have higher earnings because they have a higher reservation wage. His results showed that a superior weak-tie distribution implies higher earnings.

Lin et al. (1981) found support for Granovetter's theory on the importance of weak ties when they measured the characteristics of an individual's network composition. They studied a random sample of men in New York, asking how they found their first job and how they found their current jobs while distinguishing between strong and weak ties. Their results showed that an individual's beginning socioeconomic status is positively associated with the benefit of using a strong tie. For example, low status individuals who use strong contacts end up with lower prestige jobs than high status individuals who use strong ties as contacts. They also found the use of weak ties to be beneficial regardless of beginning socioeconomic status. Overall, these studies support the notion that weak ties are more useful in obtaining jobs than strong ties, that a large network of weak ties increases earnings, and that the use of strong ties may most benefit high status individuals.<sup>1</sup>

## Social Ties and Lawyers' Earnings

I expect social contacts to be significant in determining a lawyer's salary because of their ability to increase client acquisition with networks outside of the firm (i.e. "rainmaking," or recruiting new clients for the firm), and to increase the number of advocates with networks within the firm (i.e. mentors can help new attorneys get access to good work and billable hours). There is evidence that client acquisition positively contributes to lawyer salary (Leahey and Hunter 2012). This is a profession in which there is significant uncertainty to the client about the quality of the lawyer. Due to this uncertainty, the social network has become one of the primary determinants of a client's selection of lawyers (Nelson 1988; Abel 1989; Kitzer and Krishnan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> I will provide counter evidence of the effect of social ties on earnings in a later section.

1999). Research shows that a lawyer's reputation is the primary determinant of their ability to acquire clients (Daniels and Martin 1999). After conducting in depth interviews, Daniels and Martin (1999) concluded that the top methods of attaining clients include lawyer referrals and client referrals (direct marketing was a secondary method). Reputation is extremely significant in obtaining clients through these referral methods; a positive reputation makes others more likely to refer a lawyer while a negative reputation makes others less likely to refer a lawyer. A lawyer's networks contain pipes and prisms that can determine their reputation (Podolny 1993; 2001). Pipes help increase a reputation because of the ability of multiple individuals in a network to spread information about an individual. Prisms within a network can help increase a reputation by allowing the status of the individuals in the network to transfer to the lawyer.

Social contact with high status professionals within a firm or office also allows lawyers to reach a higher salary level. Kim (2009) examined how social networks affected income amongst lawyers in Chicago using interviews from the American Bar Foundation. He examined multiple aspects of lawyers' professional social networks such as the range of specialties among other lawyers that they knew and the number of legal contacts they had. His results showed that lawyers with higher status contacts had higher income than those with lower status professional contacts. These results provide further evidence that social capital within the office does contribute to a greater income level in lawyers. In summary, lawyers' social networks contribute to increased clientele, and salary. The status of the individuals in their network is helpful in their acquisition of higher earnings in accordance with the social capital theory. Knowing individuals in a broad range of different occupational areas is not significantly related to earnings, yet the status of those ties is significant for determining earnings (Kim 2009). More research is needed on the specific parts of the outside (non-professional) networks of lawyers and their effect on

client acquisition, income and job satisfaction, as well as the racial difference in these networks. Exploring this further is one of the central contributions of the current study.

## **Social Ties and Job Satisfaction**

Job satisfaction is an important measure of subjective success from the respondent's perspective, and has been shown to be a significant predictor of anxiety, alienation, burnout, and depression (House 1981; House and Wells 1978). Kalleberg (1977) describes two factors that affect job satisfaction: (1) the structure of the workplace (i.e. job rewards, or the rewards that people receive on the job) and (2) the objectives of the individual going into the job (i.e. work values, or the importance that individuals place on particular types of rewards). Their study examined the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of job rewards and work values on job satisfaction. Intrinsic rewards include jobs that motivate through internal benefits. These allow employees to use their own creative skills that benefit the community, creating emotional or personal rewards. Extrinsic dimensions include rewards that are tangible, such as earnings and opportunities for promotion. Kalleberg (1977) measured job satisfaction with questions that asked how satisfied they were with their current job and if they would recommend their job to others. The results showed that intrinsic work values as well as extrinsic job rewards positively affected job satisfaction.

Positive social relationships in the workplace also increase job satisfaction (Ducharme and Martin 2000; Maume and Sebastian 2007; Flap and Volker 2001; Haines et al. 1991). Some argue that social relations at work increase job satisfaction by acting as a buffer to deter or decrease individuals' anxiety and stress, while others argue that social relations exert a direct positive effect on job satisfaction. Research has shown mixed support for the buffer hypothesis and consistent support for the direct effect hypothesis. Haines et al. (1991) found that social support from co-workers and superiors in the work place decreased occupational stress, which in turn, increased occupational satisfaction. Ducharme and Martin (2000), in contrast, found evidence of the direct effect hypothesis. They measured job satisfaction by asking how satisfied workers are with their job, whether they plan to stay in their job through the next year, and whether they would recommend the job to a friend. They divided social support into four different types: instrumental support, affective support, informational support, and social companionship. These more precise measures found support for the direct effect hypothesis with affective and instrumental support among co-workers, but not for the buffer hypothesis. Individuals who received emotional support and assistance with specific needs from their coworkers were more likely to be satisfied on the job.

Another type of relationship that positively effects job satisfaction is mentoring. Allen et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis with several studies and found evidence for several ways in which mentoring increases job satisfaction. They found that in addition to receiving higher financial compensation, those who were mentored had greater satisfaction with their overall career as well as their current jobs than those who were not mentored. The literature reports little to no difference in mentoring between blacks and whites who have general occupations (Wanberg et al. 2003). Evidence from this research provides further support for the significance of social relationships, specifically mentoring, in the workplace.

## Social ties and attorneys' job satisfaction

The evidence on the effect of social ties on job satisfaction in attorneys is mixed. This is partially due to the different ways job satisfaction has been measured. Over the past few decades, however, approximately eighty percent of lawyers have described themselves to be at least "somewhat satisfied with their job" (Organ 2011). Factors that affect job satisfaction include social support from networks inside and outside the firm as well as the billable hour requirement. Higgins (2000) examined twelve law firms in New York to test the effect on having more than one mentor on job satisfaction. She found that simply having a higher number of individuals mentoring the lawyers increased their overall satisfaction with their current job. An overall positive social environment also increases job satisfaction and compensation for lawyers. Dinovitzer (2006) showed that having a dense social network of close friendship ties increased job satisfaction among Canadian attorneys.

Aside from social relationships there is also evidence that other aspects of the work requirements for attorneys contribute to job satisfaction. Billable hour requirements are one aspect of the job that decreases job satisfaction for attorneys working in law firms (Fortney 2005). Heavy billable hour requirements lead to increased hours worked and stress on the job that contributes to dissatisfaction. For example, by the mid-1990s, the median number of billable hours for an associate (a junior attorney) was 1826. To bill 1850 hours per year it is estimated that attorneys must work eleven and a half hour days five days per week (La Rue 2006). This heavy workload amongst attorneys is one aspect that decreases overall job satisfaction.

There is also evidence that social origins and career expectations have an effect on job satisfaction among attorneys specifically. Dinovitzer and Garth (2007) found this using the After the Juris Doctorate (AJD) data, a nationally representative sample of lawyers. Results showed that although income was positively correlated with job satisfaction, those who graduated from the more elite law schools and worked in the more prestigious law firms were *less* satisfied with their jobs overall than those from less elite firms and law schools. They explained that this was a result of the higher expectations of those from these elite backgrounds. Those from less elite backgrounds were more likely to exceed their expectations for success and therefore become

more satisfied with their jobs. Bartel (1981) used data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature Men and also found support for this concept as an explanation of racial differences in job success. During the period analyzed (1966-71), blacks were actually more satisfied with their jobs than whites. She attributed this to the lower expectations of blacks for their success. In summary, research shows that many factors contribute to job satisfaction including intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, common characteristics of the job, status background and career expectations. Several aspects of social capital positively affect job satisfaction such as mentoring on the job and support from co-workers.<sup>2</sup> Laband and Lentz (1995) showed how mentoring increases employee retention amongst attorneys. They found that those with high and low credentials were equally likely to be mentored, however mentor relationships were much more common in multi-lawyer firms than in solo practices. Few research projects have examined racial differences in mentoring in attorneys, and they have found no racial difference in the likelihood of having a mentor. However, there is evidence that blacks' mentor relationships were more likely to develop informally than through formal programs at their office (Wanberg et al. 2003). The majority of the job satisfaction research only, however, examines the effect of the social relationship with *co-workers* on job satisfaction and not with those outside of the job.

#### **Racial Differences in the Effects of Social Ties**

From the late 1990's research has explored racial differences in the effects of the use of social networks on employment, earnings and occupational prestige. Much of the research shows that poor minorities who use strong ties have lower earnings and occupational prestige than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The type of law an individual practices also plays a major role in determining job satisfaction in lawyers. Governmental work, *pro bono* work and other non-lucrative lawyer practices increased lawyer satisfaction compared to working in a large corporate firm despite having higher incomes (Dau-Schmidt and Mukhopadhaya 1999) possibly due to intrinsic rewards in these areas. Controlling for these differences when estimating job satisfaction is therefore very important.

whites who use such ties because of the lower status of their contacts. Korenman and Turner (1996) used two datasets to test racial differences in the effects of using job contacts on earnings in the inner city and nationwide: the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Study of Disadvantaged Youths in Boston and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They found that poor blacks were more likely to seek jobs through contacts than whites, yet less likely to acquire their jobs through them. They found mixed results about the effects of contacts on earnings among minorities. Blacks received less of a financial payoff for using contacts than whites in Boston but not nationally using the NLSY. Hispanics, on the other hand, received a smaller financial payoff for using their contacts than whites using the NLSY. They found little evidence overall that contacts accounted for racial differences in earnings nationally. They argue that the effects of personal contacts may vary based on context. For example, contacts may be on average more beneficial among white workers than black workers if contacts are detrimental in disadvantaged neighborhoods (where contacts are likely to be low status), because blacks are more likely than whites to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Less research has examined the effects of contacts for blacks who are not poor. McDonald et al. (2009) found that blacks do not differ from whites in the number of job leads they get at lower level positions, but have fewer leads on average as the authority of the job increases. This suggests that black networks contain less information about higher-level positions than white networks and therefore may be less useful in obtaining them.

Lower socioeconomic status whites and blacks also tend to use their social contacts more than high socioeconomic status individuals (Fernandez 2006). Holzer (1987) showed using the NLSY that black and white youths are more likely to use informal methods of searching through friends and relatives than formal methods to apply for jobs. The results also showed that although blacks were equally likely as whites to search for jobs through informal contacts they were 50% less likely than whites to get jobs through these contacts. There is also a difference in the value of social contacts between middle and lower class blacks. Blacks in poor neighborhoods are less likely to have friends with jobs than those in middle class neighborhoods (Rankin and Quane 2000); poor blacks are most likely to have few beneficial job leads. Weak ties may be particularly significant for blacks to succeed due to the potentially detrimental or low status nature of their strong ties.

Using strong contacts compared to weak contacts has some negative consequences for blacks, Latinos and Asians, such as the reduction of occupational status (Falcon and Melendez 2001). Elliot (1999) used data from the Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) to test the effect of neighborhood poverty and social isolation on earnings. They found that poor inner city blacks who used strong contacts (close friends and relatives) had lower earnings than those who did not use these strong contacts (those who searched for jobs through formal methods<sup>3</sup> were omitted from their analyses). Informal search strategies were also more common among less educated individuals. Green et al. (1995; 1999) found evidence that blacks' and Latinos' use of strong local ties decreased earnings, yet such use increased earnings for whites. This study controlled for human capital variables but not for the labor market conditions in which these racial groups are situated. They speculated this finding could be a result of lower quality job leads for blacks. As I will explain in the next section, blacks typically have fewer weak ties than whites due to structural differences in their social networks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Formal methods of job search consist of going directly to the job site and searching for ads in newspapers or online searches. Informal methods of job search consist of asking relatives, coworkers and friends.

In summary, research on the effect of using social contacts on earnings provides evidence that minorities' isolated social networks contribute to their lower wages and hiring rates. However, previous research primarily focused on individuals with lower socioeconomic status and is quantitative (see Fernandez 2006 for an exception). Large datasets like MCSUI and the NLSY have many benefits such as providing a large sample size that with results that are generalizable to the U.S. population. They can also be problematic, however, because they provide aggregated figures of labor markets, which could lead to misleading estimates of effects if multiple market-specific processes in which social capital has a different effect on earnings are operating in different directions (e.g. if the use of strong ties has positive effects for some specific markets and negative effects for others, or positive effects for some subgroups and negative for others). An analysis of a single market would provide an in-depth description of the operation of that specific market context, allowing for a greater understanding of its effects and the reasons for positive or negative social capital effects on racial inequality.

## Social Contacts and Racial Gaps in Job Satisfaction

Blacks are less satisfied than whites in the overall labor market (Brush et al. 1987; Kalleberg 1977). Several studies have examined which factors cause this racial difference and have found different results (Bartel 1981). Moch (1980) examined four explanations for the racial differences in black and white job satisfaction: structural, cultural, social, and social psychological. The structural explanation asserts that blacks are less satisfied due to the structural constraints of their jobs. For example, jobs with a higher proportion of blacks are more likely to have fewer promotion opportunities and have fewer job rewards than those with a higher proportion of whites (Kanter 1977). Vecchio (1980) used a sample from the General Social Survey (GSS) to show that black job satisfaction was inversely related to age, whereas white job satisfaction was positively associated with age. Vecchio (1980) argued blacks are discriminated against and therefore have fewer opportunities as they grow older. The cultural explanation emphasizes that racial differences in beliefs and values cause groups to respond differently to a work environment and therefore have different levels of job satisfaction (Hulin et al. 1975). The social explanation contends that there are racial differences in the friendship networks that develop on the job, which leads to different levels of satisfaction. The social psychological explanation describes how those who perceived themselves to be discriminated against would often have less job satisfaction than those who did not perceive discrimination.

Moch's (1980) data came from a sample of 466 employees in the south and found evidence in support of each explanation. Blacks were promoted less, had fewer positions in management, and were less likely to feel socially integrated into their workplace, and these factors contributed their lower levels of job satisfaction. Although each explanation affected job satisfaction for blacks, they did not fully explain the strong racial difference in black and white satisfaction. Blacks were still less satisfied with their jobs after controlling for each of these factors (and were less satisfied than Mexican Americans, who experienced similar structural and social isolation on the job). This study provides evidence for the robust size of racial differences in job satisfaction and that social integration affects, but does not completely explain, this relationship. Other research found that financial rewards and work values do mediate the racial difference in overall job satisfaction (Kalleberg and Loscocco 1983).

Social relationships are significantly related to racial differences in job satisfaction amongst lawyers specifically. Payne-Pikus et al.'s (2010) research analyzed data from After the Juris Doctorate survey (AJD), in order to test the institutional discrimination explanation as a cause of the dearth of black lawyers in corporate firms. They measured job satisfaction as a composite index of the respondents' satisfaction with 17 different aspects of their work (see Appendix B for the specific items used; I will use the same index in this study). They measured discrimination with social capital questions asking whether or not they join partners for meals, and whether or not they are satisfied with their relationships with their mentors. The results showed that these social capital variables explained much of the white advantage over black attorneys in job satisfaction and therefore probably contributed to the lack of black lawyers in corporate law relative to other options within the legal labor market. In this study, I further explore the social capital explanations of racial differences in job satisfaction and salary within both corporate law firm and government jobs.

## Social Network Composition and Race

There are several different dimensions of a social network that are important to how the network might influence job success. These dimensions include size, density and range. The size of the network represents how many individuals are in the network (how many people an individual is connected to). The density of a network is the proportion of alters who know one another compared to the overall number of possible relationships in a network (Jackson et al 1977). A network in which the individual's ties are connected to each other has high density. The range of a network indicates the heterogeneity of the individuals within it (Burt 1983). A higher level of diversity in the status of those in a network increases the amount of alternatives and is beneficial for attainment (Burt 1983). Networks with high levels of density, range, size and status have a greater ability to support their individuals (although, of course, size and density are usually inversely related). For example, Haines et al. (1996) examined the networks of individuals in Louisiana after hurricane Andrew, and found that those with larger or denser networks were more likely to have received assistance from their networks than those in smaller

or less dense networks. Similarly, Renzulli and Aldrich (2005) found that the range and status of the business owners' networks contributed to their acquisition of resources. Those with higher status networks (more men than women) received more contributions from within their network than those in lower status networks. Those in networks with more occupational heterogeneity also received more contributions from within their network.

There are documented racial differences in these dimensions of social networks in the U.S. Researchers agree that black social networks of strong ties are smaller than whites' strong ties networks (Tigges et al. 1998; McPherson et al. 2006). In fact, blacks have the smallest networks of strong ties of any racial group (Marsden 1987). Black neighborhoods are also segregated at every socioeconomic level (Wilson 2009; Massey and Denton 1993; Patillo 1999), which may lead to lower status ties for blacks because of the greater likelihood of blacks of almost all socioeconomic backgrounds living and attending school relatively near poor blacks. Research shows that black social networks are more racially heterogeneous than whites' networks (Marsden 1987), but have a smaller range of status. Using the GSS, Marsden and Hurlbert (1988) examined the overall social network composition of all Americans. Blacks overall had smaller and more racially heterogeneous social networks than whites. Tigges et al. (1998) examined the network composition of whites and blacks across neighborhood composition in Atlanta using survey data from MCSUI. This was a test of Wilson's (1987) hypothesis that individuals living in poor segregated neighborhoods are socially isolated and only have limited networks. Their results showed that poor and nonpoor blacks were more isolated than nonpoor whites. They were less likely to live with another adult, had fewer collegeeducated discussion partners and were less likely to have a close tie. This provides further

evidence that blacks have smaller close networks and a lower average status in their networks than whites.

In summary, research on the significance of social networks differentiates between strong and weak ties. The research shows strong support for a positive effect of weak ties on job acquisition and earnings. There is empirical support for Montgomery's (1992) theory that having more weak ties makes their use beneficial and having fewer weak ties makes their use detrimental. Black networks are smaller than white networks. They also have a lower average status in their networks than whites. Blacks live in more segregated neighborhoods than whites at all socioeconomic levels and this may contribute to the lower status in their network contacts. These racial differences in network composition may contribute to some of the racial differences in occupational success. The next section will describe the theoretical explanations for how social contacts affect job success.

## **Social Capital Theory and Racial Differences**

For my dissertation I will explore the social capital theory as an explanation for the benefits or drawbacks of social contacts for occupational success. To this point we understand that social contacts contain strong and weak ties and that there are differences in the composition of white and black social networks. Many studies support the hypothesis that social networks may negatively affect blacks' job success and positively affect whites' job success. To better understand the mechanisms that can create these dynamics, we turn to social capital theory.

According to the social capital theory, resources embedded in our social networks can be used for occupational success. Several sociological theorists have created definitions of social capital (Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1989; Portes 1998). I will use Portes' (1998) definition of social capital that combines theories from Bourdieu and Coleman. This definition states that social capital is the *ability to secure benefits through one's membership in social networks*. Portes' theory emphasizes that the status of an individual's contact affects their ability to use that contact to increase their status attainment. In other words, contacts with higher occupational prestige can lead to an increased occupational prestige for the individual. Several studies support this theory (Lin et al. 1981; Bridges and Villemez, 1986; Braddock and McPartland, 1987; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988). This definition is helpful because it highlights the significance of the *ability to secure benefits*. Just having multiple resources in the network is not enough; one must have the ability to secure benefits from those resources. For example, having a large network of ties is not helpful if none of them will help you find work or acquire clients.

Portes' definition builds on the work of Bourdieu, the first to provide a solid definition of social capital. He defined it as: "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248; 1980). In this definition, the human capital, or the skills, education and resources, of one's contacts, is positively related to one's social capital. Also, one's relationship with an individual determines their ability to access their resources. This definition is easily applicable in the study of social networks because a contact's status will theoretically exert a positive effect on earnings because it will increase the "actual or potential resources" available from that contact, with access to those resources dependent on the type of relationship that exists between the two people.

Coleman (1988) is the second father of social capital theory. He defined this concept as "a variety of entities with two elements in common: (1) They consist of some aspect of the social structure and (2) facilitate the action of its actors within the structure" (Coleman 1988a: p. S98). Coleman established three forms of social capital. The first form is establishing trust in the norm of

reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity is the belief that if you do something for someone in your group, someone in the group will reciprocate that benefit back to you in some way. This can be through the same deed performed by the same person in the group, or by a different deed from some other person in the group. Stack (1974) provides an empirical example of a Black community with strong trust in the norm of reciprocity when she describes a community that constantly borrows material items and services from one another. The second form of Coleman's social capital is the flow of information. For example, when an individual in your group is a mechanic, you can use that expertise to help you buy a car. The third form of Coleman's social capital is establishing social norms. For example, a neighborhood that has a norm of looking out for one another facilitates the action of calling the police if one sees suspicious activity because that individual would feel compelled to do so.

Coleman's social capital is defined more broadly, in terms of the benefits of a close-knit group. He argues that social closure and generational closure of these groups increase the amount of social capital within these groups. Closure is defined as "the existence of sufficient ties between a group to guarantee the observance of norms" (Coleman 1988). Coleman's definition differs from Bourdieu's because it focuses on the density of the network (i.e. closure) and the norms that develop in dense networks. Sampson et al. (1999) found that black neighborhoods overall have lower levels of social capital as defined by Coleman (1988). These neighborhoods had lower levels of intergenerational closure, had fewer established norms and less social control than whites' neighborhoods. This racial discrepancy in neighborhood social capital may account for some of the differences in the effects of social capital on economic attainment. Those who are unable to establish norms may also have a lower ability to access social resources from their group for economic gain. Coleman's definition of social capital also allows us to better
conceptualize explanations of its possible *negative* effects. For example, the social closure of social capital networks may uphold a standard of mediocrity and discourage excellence, and close-knit groups may establish deviant norms and expectations or create obligations to provide goods and services to others even at personal cost (Portes and Landolt 2000).

Each of these definitions of social capital highlights its ability to secure resources from social relationships with a social network. In this study, I will measure both the extent of social networks and the ability to secure benefits from those networks, in order to build on these important insights about the importance of network structure and the resources in the network. For example, as I will explain below, we would expect different resources to be available from kin networks than professional networks, and we would expect general professional networks to have different resources available than a mentoring relationship within a workplace.

# Bridging Versus Bonding Social Capital and Race

Another important distinction in types of relationships and the resources they facilitate is the distinction between bridging and bonding organizations in social capital. Putnam (2000) defines bonding social capital, on the one hand, as "a group that creates strong group loyalty and closeness among individuals within the group but may result in a resentment of those outside of the group" (Putnam 2000). Fraternities are examples of organizations with high bonding social capital. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, includes heterogeneous links to different groups and associations. The American Sociological Association is a bridging organization because it contains sociologists with varying interests and ties to various institutions. This concept is similar to having many weak ties as bridges to multiple different types of social networks as explained by Granovetter (1973). Putnam explains that one group typically has a degree of both bridging and bonding, and that these concepts are not mutually exclusive, but that

groups are often composed *more* of "bonding" connections or "bridging" connections. As explained in the earlier sections, black networks are smaller and have on average lower status strong ties than whites (Tigges et al. 1998). From these characteristics, I would argue that if we are interested in bridging across social status groups, blacks overall have *less* bridging social capital networks than whites. In contrast, blacks also have more racially heterogeneous social networks than whites, so if we are focused on bridging across racial groups, Blacks have *more* bridging social capital networks than whites.

Bridging social capital has been shown to have several benefits. According to Subramanian and Kawachi (2006), bridging social capital greatly increases civic engagement and even physical health; they measure bridging and bonding social capital through the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and test its effect on health outcomes.<sup>4</sup> Their results also show that both bridging and bonding social capital are positively associated with higher reports of health. Much of the research of bridging and bonding social capital measure this concept as a characteristic of an association or group (Coffe and Geys 2006; Subramanian and Kawachi 2006; Stoll et al. 1998; Paxton 2002), and most of these studies therefore focus on macro-level outcomes like civic and democratic engagement, rather than individual outcomes like income or job satisfaction. For example, Coffe and Geys (2006) created an index of groups in which the further a group diverged from the general population the more they were considered bonding and not bridging. This is different from social network analysis of social capital, which is mainly measured in terms of individual's contacts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Subramanian and Kawachi (2006), calculated participants as having bonding social capital if their most important formal group was similar to them in sex, race/ethnicity and education. They determined that individuals had high bridging social capital if their most important formal group was dissimilar to them in sex, race/ethnicity and education.

Despite the focus in the literature on the organizational implications of bridging and bonding and the emphasis on macro-level outcomes, these concepts have important implications for individual outcomes like job success because of the importance of a diverse set of weak ties (bridging ties) for job searches, and the potential importance of bonding social capital at work for job satisfaction. For example, research on voluntary organizations shows that involvement in large organizations is more likely to increase an individual's weak ties (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986). The authors explain that large organizations create opportunities for interpersonal contacts to develop. They also explain that large organizations are more likely to have an internal structure that facilitates interaction between weak ties. The study showed that men's involvement in larger voluntary organizations increased their weak social ties more than women's.

Within attorneys, voluntary organizations play a major role in supporting an increasingly diverse profession. Historically black organizations such as the National Bar Organization were created to create contacts for young minority attorneys to connect with more successful and experienced minority attorneys, to increase their ability to get mentors and to grow professionally (Hargrove 2010). Oseid (2007) described the significance of these organizations in creating mentor relationships. The American Inns of Courts is another example of an organization that is designed to form and strengthen mentoring relationships. Meetings of this organization include informal sessions where highly experienced attorneys interact with inexperienced attorneys based on common interests such as subareas of law. These organizations are part bridging because of their diversity in experience levels, and part bonding because of the shared subject interest in the Inns of Court and shared race/ethnic status in the National Bar Organization. The bridging and bonding characteristics of these organizations facilitated the informal development of mentor relationships.

In summary, bridging and bonding social capital reflect the inclusive and exclusive nature of a group respectively. Large voluntary organizations create multiple opportunities for the acquisition of weak ties, which is an important dynamic to consider in a professional labor market with multiple large voluntary organizations (like alumni associations for each law school). Bonding organizations, like race-specific professional organizations, are also beneficial because they allow for increased solidarity and loyalty within the group. We know little about how these types of social capital affect job success, but the evidence mentioned above provides a theoretical premise for a positive effect.

## Alternative Explanation for Social Contacts and Employment

Although I focused above on the many studies that find that social capital does help explain the racial gap in earnings (Elliot 1999; Falcon and Melendez 2001), others find no evidence of this, leading to an alternative explanation for why social contacts and employment outcomes might be related. Mouw's tests of the relationship between the job search and the social contacts that individuals used during their search provided evidence that the use of contacts while hunting for a job has little to no effect on earnings for whites or blacks. Mouw (2002; 2003; 2006) describes an alternative explanation in which social capital's relationship with income is conflated with the homophily tendency for individuals with similar characteristics to associate with one another more than those of dissimilar characteristics (McPherson, et al. 2001). He also suggests that low wages among blacks are not a direct result of social capital ties and their use but that their social capital ties are endogenous to the types of job opportunities available to them in the labor market. He points out that cross-sectional studies find that black workers who use social networks to find jobs have lower wages, but his longitudinal research (including the NLSY) suggests that there is no negative effect of using contacts at an earlier wave on later wages (2002). He criticized MCSUI data for not being longitudinal, and explained that it could only measure the relationship between social capital and the *existence of contacts* on job success but not on the actual use of these contacts. With longitudinal data, Mouw (2003) conducted a fixed-effects analysis on the effect of social capital variables such as the education levels and employment status of social contacts. He found that although individuals with high status social contacts had higher earnings, they were not more likely to use their contacts to get a job than people with lower levels of social capital. He explained this finding by arguing that the social capital variables of friends' occupational status and educational status were spuriously related to earnings.

Mouw's (2002) results also show that those with a higher proportion of friends in their same job along with the same average education level of their friends had higher earnings. His studies provide evidence that social capital does not affect success in the job-hunting process. However, social capital may still affect job success in specific job markets because every market has distinct characteristics that may lead to different outcomes. For example, labor markets with greater uncertainty (those with less clear signals from credentials, for example), might rely more on social connections than those with very clear signals (those that have concrete training credentials). Mouw's studies also do not address how social capital might affect job satisfaction and career trajectories *after* the job begins, because he is focusing on the potential effect of social capital on the job-hunting process. Even in the presence of homophilic patterns of friendship formation, some workers, especially in high status professions, may develop early on-the-job social capital connections (e.g. mentoring relationships, social support, organizational ties, etc.) that facilitate long-term career success and satisfaction. This is a different type of social capital

effect than Mouw is measuring, and it is an important possible mechanism for this study of attorneys, which includes measures of mentorship on the job.

Mouw's research does, however, expose several issues that a researcher must take into account when testing the effect of social capital on job success. The first factor is the size of the network of the individual. Mouw endorses Montgomery's (1992) theory that a larger set of contacts will increase the reservation wage of the individual and thus help determine the wage of the job taken, even if it is not found directly using contacts. Second, the labor market available to the individual, given the individual's human capital, must be taken into account because many individuals who only have qualifications for a particular labor market position will be bound by the earnings limits of that market. As Mouw (2002) explains, the fact that blacks achieved lower earnings using their contacts does not necessarily show that their contacts caused them to be in lower paying jobs; it may be that they had few opportunities for higher paying jobs, which is related to their social network because of the principle of homophily (i.e. their human capital resembles the human capital of their friends). One must be able to distinguish social capital from personal opportunity and make sure individuals with greater job success and better contacts do not have those contacts simply because they are in the more successful labor market and are less likely to be discriminated against.

Kim (2009) showed that Mouw's findings may not apply to lawyer networks. Mouw's main critique of social capital theory was that previous evidence did not take into account the possibility of social capital effects being confounded with labor market differences (Mouw 2003). In order to control for the possibility of labor market differences in high-status firms mediating the relationship between social capital and job success, Kim (2009) distinguishes several variables that account for the prestige of the firm. These control variables include firm size,

percentage of business clients, percentage of long-term corporate clients, as well as controls for whether or not those in the individual's network worked in their own firm. Controlling for the prestige of the firm and the individual allows Kim to examine the market within the lawyer occupation as a potential mediator. If the labor market was driving the results, then low-status individuals' access to high status contacts would not increase their salary. His findings indicate that contact with more prestigious contacts leads to a higher income regardless of the individual's occupational prestige. One still cannot conclude causation with these data, however, because the temporal order has not been established and there may still be other spurious variables that are unaccounted for.

My study will specifically examine the effects of social capital for lawyers on both job satisfaction and earnings. Lawyers are working in a job market with great financial opportunity and where only a single credential is available (although of course law schools vary in prestige). Therefore, if blacks do not do well after earning a law degree, it would be less feasible to blame it on the opportunities available or lack of human capital. This is therefore a job market ripe for examination of social capital factors, because there are many possible mechanisms by which social connections could affect attorney success and satisfaction. For example, compensation in this market is often heavily based on clientele acquisition and therefore may be more dependent on social contacts than markets that are not clientele-based.

The current research will take several precautions to avoid Mouw's critique of social capital theory. First, it eliminates variance in occupation level of the individuals, thus eliminating the possibility of social contacts being endogenous to different labor markets because the workers would be coming from a similar, albeit not congruent, prestige level. The study will also control for firm size, similar to Kim's (2009) method, to decrease the possibility of a labor

market explanation (i.e. if we observe effects of social capital even for those in low-status sectors of the job market, then homophily explanations are less likely). Firm size is a significant positive predictor of occupational prestige and income (Heinz and Laumann 1982; Sander 2006; Wilkins and Gulati (1996) therefore controlling for firm size should decrease the probability that the effect of being in contact with a high prestige individual is mediated by homophily. Also, Kim explained that examining the early part of the attorneys' careers will better test the effect of the use of social contacts on job success by, as Mouw does as well, decreasing the possibility of the contacts reported resulting from previous job success.

Finally, the current study provides a set of more extensive measures of social capital than previous studies. I use several self-reported measures about the perceived significance of their contacts in several aspects of the job as well as questions assessing the nature of relationships with colleagues and superiors at their workplace. These measures will better isolate the effect of social capital at work, after the job search process has concluded because some of the questions asks how they have actually used their social contacts. These provisions will allow a stronger test of the effect of social capital on a range of job success measures.

# **Case Study: The Legal Profession**

In order to better understand the effects of contacts on job success in one labor market, I focus on individuals with law degrees. Law is an ideal labor market for maximizing the possible impact of social networks on job outcomes because its clientele are heavily based on the attorney's social networks (Grodsky and Pager 2001), and it is a popular profession to study because there is a plethora of quantitative data available on it. Client acquisition is not an important aspect for many other professions such as a social workers or professors. Therefore, social capital may not be as significant in determining the black-white earnings gap among them.

Conversely client acquisition is an important aspect for professions that resemble law such as realtors and pharmaceutical salespeople, therefore social capital is more likely to be a significant predictor of earnings in these fields (Leahey and Hunter 2012).

Social capital is also important for lawyers because the stress of the job may require a level of social support for success and satisfaction. Garth and Sterling (2009) examined qualitative interviews of lawyers in the AJD and found two major determining factors of handling the demands of the job and staying the course to partnership in corporate law firms. Both of these factors are related to social support from others. The first factor is having the social support from peers and superiors within the firm to handle the apprenticeship responsibilities of a law firm associate. The second factor is the social support from family and friends to handle the heavy workload of working at the firm. Garth and Sterling (2009) show that white upper middle class lawyers in the firm are more likely than women and minorities to have family support and peer support, and minorities reported feeling out of place in the large corporate firms.

This profession also requires a great deal of education. One prominent explanation for the earnings difference among blacks and whites is that blacks are placed into jobs that require less education and skill, and therefore pay less. Educational requirement levels are identical with attorneys. Lawyers are also an ideal profession to examine because, as mentioned in the introduction, law has one of the highest black-white earnings gaps in the country. Grodsky and Pager (2001) found only four professions with a greater unadjusted black-white income gap than lawyers: security and financial services sales occupations, podiatrists, insurance sales occupations, and longshore equipment operators. Only one of these occupations, podiatrist, requires a professional degree, and it is a much more specialized occupation that includes a far smaller segment of the population. This is not to say that there is not a huge amount of

differentiation in the jobs that lawyers do; the law job market is highly stratified and the variation in job success is sizable (Heinz and Laumann 1982; Heinz et al. 2005). For example, lawyers at large corporate firms of 100 or more are perceived as elite, and have far higher earnings than the average attorney (Sander 2006). I will take this into account in the current study because there may be separate processes that determine earnings in the very high end of the law job market, relative to the rest of the market.

The majority of associates and partners in large corporate firms, the highest earning tier of the market, have graduated from the top 30 law schools with high GPAs. This trend of only accepting graduates from the top law schools with the highest GPAs is changing somewhat, however. Over the past few decades the elite schools and large corporate firms have sought out more blacks but have not been able to retain them at high rates (Sander 2006). Sander calls this the "racial paradox" of corporate law, in which blacks are hired into large firms but do not remain. Also, there has been an increase in the number of lawyers hired into corporate firms who graduated from urban law schools, or schools in large metropolitan areas that are not ranked in the top 30 (Wilkins et al. 2007). Although this rise in non-elite law school graduates is present, the corporate law firms are still dominated by those from elite law schools.

# The Racial Earnings Gap in the Legal Profession

The research on the exact pay differential between black and white attorneys is mixed. Dinovitzer et al. (2004) reports from the AJD (2000) show that the median black lawyer salary two to three years after finishing law school is \$65,000, whereas the white median lawyer salary is \$73,000. Grodsky and Pager (2001) found the mean earnings of black attorneys, averaging across all levels of work experience, are seventy nine percent of the mean earnings of white attorneys.<sup>5</sup>

One major reason for this gap is the career path that many black lawyers take. Blacks are severely underrepresented in the area of law that is most lucrative, corporate firms, and overrepresented in government work (Sander 2006; Wilkins and Gulati 1996). About six percent of the lawyer population is black while eighty percent are white. Twenty-four percent of these black lawyers work in the government sector compared to 15% of white attorneys in the government sector. This shows the disproportionate amount of blacks in the government sector (Dinovitzer et al. 2004; Capell 1990), and is evidence of the segmented labor markets available to attorneys. In the days before affirmative action, the largest corporate firms only hired graduates from the most elite law schools and corporate lawyers were predominantly white upper middle class males (Sterling and Reichman 2010; Sander 2006). Corporate law firms massively expanded from the 1960s to the 90s. A large firm used to be considered one with 50 or 100 lawyers, but now there are mega-firms (created by the mergers of more than one firm) consisting of over 500 attorneys. Wilkins et al. (2007) showed that as law firms have expanded, they have begun to accept more applicants from 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> tier law schools as well as minorities. Other research has suggested that corporate firms have also sought to hire more blacks as a result of affirmative action policies (Sander 2006).

Previous literature explains how the lawyer occupation is heavily stratified from within and describes the structural causes for this segmentation. Heinz and Laumann (1982) conducted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> One reason that recent cohorts might have a smaller racial gap in pay than the overall population of lawyers is that representation of blacks is greater among recent cohorts of law school graduates than it is for cohorts of attorneys who graduated decades ago, when black admission rates in law schools were significantly lower (Sander 2006). Thus there is a greater representation of whites among the oldest cohorts, who are earning the most, and a greater representation of blacks among the newest cohorts, who are earning the least.

a study that analyzed data from a sample of Chicago law firms in 1975 and found that lawyers who work with clients representing large corporations and those representing individuals or small businesses represent two separate types of lawyers. The study showed that those representing large corporations are more likely to work in large firms while those in representing the individuals and smaller businesses are more likely to work in solo practices. They hypothesized that attorneys who represented the larger corporations represented a distinct hemisphere of law while those who represented individual clients and smaller businesses were the other hemisphere. Those working in the governmental sector represented the middle portion of the spectrum. There are structural factors that cause this propensity to work in the different hemispheres. Those working in large firms generally come from prestigious law schools and have a higher socioeconomic status. For example, attorneys in the higher hemispheres are more likely to have obtained their positions through the 'old boy' networks because most of those in these positions were white Anglo Saxon Protestants. Lawyers who do not fit the profile of this hemisphere were more likely to move to another area of work (Heinz et al. 2005). This is one of the reasons for the large racial, ethnic, religious, and gender disparities in activity in these two hemispheres of attorney work. Having these types of clients leads to a financial advantage for those with the corporate clients compared to those with individual clients.

There are five explanations for the continuing dearth of black lawyers in large firms, even in this context of expanding opportunities: (1) conventional discrimination at the point of hiring and during their work experience; (2) blacks have trouble acclimating to the culture of the firm; (3) stereotype discrimination, where blacks receive fewer mentoring opportunities based on a stereotypical idea of black intellectual inferiority and laziness; (4) racial differences in individual career preferences, leading black attorneys to prefer other types of legal work; and (5) racial differences in merit (Sander 2006). Sander found empirical support for the explanation that blacks are heavily recruited into elite law schools and corporate firms through affirmative action policies but they had lower grades in law school. Once they get in to firms, he argues that they receive little mentoring and training to succeed, and he hypothesizes that this is because of their lower average grades. They become unhappy with their positions and are more likely to leave shortly after being hired. This explanation is a combination of merit and stereotype discrimination because he describes how blacks, once in the large firms, are perceived to have less potential because of their lower GPAs in law school.

Sander's argument points to the potential importance of mentoring relationships for lawyers in large corporate firms. Wilkins and Gulati (1996) argue that a lack of mentoring for minorities is one of the most significant reasons for the lack of black corporate lawyers. Firms hire large numbers of black associates, but limited numbers of partners are available for mentoring, therefore it can be especially difficult for minorities to receive that training if in fact homophily is occurring (i.e. white partners are more likely to mentor white associates) or if partners engage in some type of stereotype discrimination. It appears that blacks face discrimination and dissimilarity effects with partners at their firm, making it more difficult for them to develop these mentor relationships on the job. As mentioned in a previous section, there is evidence that blacks are mentored just as often as whites, however these black mentor relationships are more likely to develop informally than whites. Research shows that formal mentoring programs have no effect on minorities becoming partners in law firms (Kay and Gorman 2012). Surprisingly, Kay and Gorman (2012) found that a cultural norm of fostering professional development in the firm was found to decrease the proportion of minorities in leadership positions. This may indicate that partners in firms are not as likely to build and

maintain mentoring relationships with black attorneys even when forced to do it through mentoring programs and cultural norms. This forces black attorneys to seek mentors in outside firms and practices that may not be as beneficial as those that develop within the firm. The qualitative portion of my study presents face-to-face interviews attorneys from large and small firms to get a rich description of the significance of mentors in their job success – both earnings and satisfaction with their jobs and careers.

Because the likelihood of becoming a partner at larger corporate firms has significantly decreased, all lawyers have become more likely to enter into corporate law firms with the intention of only staying for a short time. In the 1970s and 80s it took three to five years to become a partner; now it takes seven to nine years (Sterling and Reichman 2010). The plan to only temporarily occupy corporate law positions is becoming more common amongst the general lawyer population (Sterling and Reichman 2010), yet the racial paradox of the lack of black corporate lawyers, especially at the rank of partner, is still, no doubt, a significant factor in determining the black-white earnings gap of lawyers. Future research must further assess the causes of this paradox, but this research illustrates several of the ways that social capital shapes these disparities.

In summary, there is evidence for the significance of social capital in increasing salary and job satisfaction, although that evidence is mixed. Social capital is potentially particularly significant amongst attorneys due to their need to establish a positive reputation and the importance of client acquisition. There is a large level of inequality amongst attorneys in different sectors of law (Heinz and Laumann 1982). Those in larger firms are more likely to have higher prestige backgrounds than those in smaller firms and solo practices. Blacks are less likely than whites to work in the higher status legal sector and less likely to remain there even if they start their career in a large corporate firm (Wilkins and Gulati 1996). Being immersed in high status social networks contributes to attorneys' entrance into the prestigious sector of the profession.

Research primarily measures the effect of these professional relationships, but less research explores the effect of social networks outside of the profession, including voluntary organizations, on occupational attainment. Prestige of attorney contact is positively related to salary amongst private firm attorneys. This phenomenon has not been examined among other types of social networks or legal sectors. This dissertation explores the ability of social capital in multiple social networks (including those within the occupation, those in voluntary organizations, and networks outside of the profession) to determine which sector blacks will work in, as well as its ability to increase the salary and job satisfaction within these sectors.

# CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE HYPOTHESES, DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS

## **Research Questions**

In this research project I measure social capital with both organizational and individual measures to test its relationship with earnings and job satisfaction among lawyers. The major research questions ask:

- Does social capital have any relationship with lawyer job satisfaction and salary?
- 2) Does social capital account for any of the black-white discrepancy in lawyer salary and job satisfaction? If so, how much does social capital account for these black-white differences in salary and job satisfaction?
- 3) How do the effects of social capital differ across professional, non-professional and kin networks?

To reiterate, the definition of social capital is one's ability to access resources within one's social networks. An individual has several different social networks from which s/he can access resources and some may be more beneficial than others depending on the desired outcome. For this particular study I distinguish three of the most significant and common social networks. The first is the professional network. This network consists of colleagues, mentors, and superiors who are in the same profession. The ties in this network are predominantly weak because they consist of interactions at a formal and professional level although, of course, on-the-job interactions can become strong ties if there is a lot of contact between the individuals. The second is the non-professional network. It consists of ties within networks outside of the profession including involvement in voluntary clubs and formal organizations that are not related to the profession. This network consists of strong and weak ties because of the strong relationships that can develop in close-knit groups, and the many weak ties to other organization members who attend the same meetings and events. The third network is the kinship network. This consists of ties to close family and friends. This network consists of primarily strong ties, however some estranged family members and distant relatives may be considered weak ties in these networks.

# **Hypotheses**

I propose four hypotheses regarding the effect of social capital on earnings across race and three hypotheses regarding the effect of social capital on job satisfaction. The first hypothesis addresses how social capital may be related to lawyers' wages in three parts. As Kim (2009) and Nelson (1988) explain, clients use status in network ties as an indicator of lawyer skill when there is uncertainty. The status and size of their networks makes them appear more valuable to clients. Additionally, networks act like pipes through which vital information can flow leading to career advancement. I deduce hypothesis 1 from these theoretical developments:

H 1-A: High levels of professional and non-professional social capital are positively correlated with personally recruiting a greater number of new clients.

H 1-B: Recruiting a greater number of clients is correlated with higher earnings for lawyers.

H 1-C: High levels of professional and non-professional social capital are correlated with higher overall earnings, which are partly explained by the positive correlation between social capital and the number of new clients recruited by the lawyer.

Hypothesis 2 is based on competing findings in the literature for the effect of social capital on earnings for blacks. On the one hand, as a result of blacks facing fewer mentoring opportunities, greater difficulty acclimating to cultural differences in corporate firms, and

discrimination at work (Sterling and Reichman 2010), social capital may boost their earnings due its ability to directly combat the negative effects of the aforementioned hindrances as explained in the first competing hypothesis:

H 2-A: Blacks' use of social capital will increase earnings; the positive relationship

between social capital and earnings will be larger for blacks compared to whites. On the other hand, blacks have overall smaller social networks with a lower status range than whites (McPherson et al. 2006; Tigges 1999), making their social contacts potentially less valuable, leading to the following competing hypothesis:

H 2-B: Blacks who use social capital more will have *smaller (or even negative)* earnings gains over black peers, compared to the earnings gains of whites who use social capital more than their peers.

The third hypothesis involves the effect of non-professional organizational involvement on earnings. Large bridging organizations provide resources that can increase the number and status of their clientele. The bridging nature of these organizations and their ability to provide access to many weak ties will increase lawyers' ability to gain status and clientele and should therefore contribute to increased earnings (Granovetter 1973; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Putnam 2000). Therefore:

H 3: Lawyers involved in large voluntary organizations will have higher earnings than those who are not.

Next, I predict that social capital contributes to the racial differences in attorneys' job sector, an important predictor of earnings among attorneys. According to the literature, black social networks have lower status, on average, and contain fewer leads about prestigious jobs than whites (McDonald et al. 2009). There is evidence that blacks who use their social contacts to get

jobs have lower economic attainment (Korenman and Turner 1996) than whites. Due to the prestigious nature of most private sector jobs (e.g. working in corporate law firms) in relation to public sector jobs (e.g. working in government), hypothesis 4 states the following:

H 4: Blacks who used social contacts extensively are more likely to work in public sector jobs than whites who used social contacts extensively.

I have a similar set of hypotheses for the job satisfaction outcome. I hypothesize that those with a high level of social capital have higher levels of job satisfaction. Payne-Pikus et al. (2010) found this to be case in their study of corporate lawyers, and I hypothesize this generalizes more broadly to attorneys working in many different contexts:

H 5: High levels of professional and non-professional social capital on the job are correlated with high levels of job satisfaction.

Strong family and friend ties can also be used to cope with the heavy time and stress demands of the job (Garth and Sterling 2009). Also, support from co-workers can help increase overall job-satisfaction (Ducharme and Martin 2000). Therefore:

H 6: Use of kinship social capital and emotionally supportive professional social capital in lawyers will increase job satisfaction.

There are two competing hypotheses for the effect of black-white differences in kinship social capital. We already know from previous research that white attorneys have higher overall levels of job satisfaction than black attorneys (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010). This may be because, or in spite of, their levels of support from kinship networks. One argument is that black kinship networks are stronger than whites' networks because their overall lack of resources forces them to be closer (Allen 1979; Aschenbrenner 1975; Hill 1999; Lempert 1999; McAdoo 1980; Newman 1999; Nobles 1978; Stack 1974; Staples 1981; Sudarkasa 1996), even though blacks

list fewer kin among their strong network ties than members of other racial groups do (Marsden 1987). I will begin by testing whether black attorneys report, on average, more or less support from their kinship networks than White attorneys. Then I will compare the effect of kinship support on job satisfaction by testing two competing hypotheses:

H 7-A: Blacks with higher levels of kinship support will have *larger* job satisfaction gains over their black peers with low levels of support, compared to whites with higher rates of kinship support than their peers.

This support alleviates stress of the workplace and increases job satisfaction (Garth and Sterling 2009; Haines 1991). The competing rationale is that blacks have less supportive kinship networks that have a negative effect on them relative to the effects on whites because their families overall cause them more stress than whites due to the lack of resources in the family (Anderson 1990; Jewell 1988; Murray 1984; Patterson 1998; Roschelle 1997; Wilson 1987). According to this rationale I formulate hypothesis 7-B:

H 7-B: Blacks with higher levels of kinship support will have *smaller* job satisfaction gains over their peers, compared to whites with higher rates of kinship support than their peers. <sup>6</sup>

#### Data

I use data from the After the JD survey (AJD) to test the effects of social capital on job success. The AJD is the ideal dataset to use because it is longitudinal, nationally representative, and asks questions assessing social capital and job success for attorneys who have recently graduated from law school. This survey is representative of lawyers admitted to the bar in 1999 or 2000. There have been two waves of data collection for this survey. The first wave (AJDI)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Appendix A contains a table of all the hypotheses together.

took place in 2002-03. The study sampled lawyers from 18 markets of lawyers across different regions of the United States. This included the four major job markets that consist of at least 2,000 new lawyers: Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and Washington D.C. It also included five "large" markets with 750-2,000 new lawyers: Boston, Atlanta, Houston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. The final nine markets were the smaller markets, consisting of: Connecticut, New Jersey, Florida, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Indiana, St. Louis, Utah, and Oregon. The AJDI oversampled 1,465 blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The questionnaire was administered by mail in May of 2002, and followed up with non-respondents with telephone surveys. The final response rate was 71%.<sup>7</sup> The total number of cases of participants answering some part of the survey from this sample in the first wave was N=5,353 with 363 blacks and 3,048 whites. The second wave (AJDII) took place from 2008-09. Researchers were able to retain about three-fourths of the respondents from AJDI. Researchers collected the remainder of the sample for a final of N=4,442 with 345 blacks and 2,698 whites for the second wave.

Lawyers in the second wave had been practicing for eight to ten years. There are advantages and disadvantages of examining attorneys near the beginning of their careers. Early career lawyers have different characteristics from experienced lawyers. They have less experience and on average earn less, but this characteristic should be constant across race and should not change the results unless there are systematic differences in the racial patterns of early- and late-career attorneys. It is also important to note that examining one *cohort* of attorneys is a significant advantage because it ensures that the experiences of the respondents are comparable. The average racial differences in years of experience that we would find if we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This study also contains a qualitative interview portion where they conducted 100 face-to-face interviews with a subset of respondents, however the publicly available dataset does not allow access to the qualitative data.

examined all practicing attorneys (i.e. because of the tendency to graduate more white attorneys in the past, there are proportionally fewer black attorneys with many years of experience than white attorneys with many years of experience) means that the inequality we find in this sample should be lower than the racial inequality we would find among all currently practicing attorneys.

Black and Hispanic lawyers had the lowest pay in the sample, in part because they clustered in lower paying sectors (government and non-profit). The social capital (independent) variables come from wave I with the exception of those asking what social resources they used to receive their current job. The clientele and job success (dependent) variables come from wave II. This establishes a temporal order in the relationship between social capital and job success, which others have noted is important for this type of question (Mouw 2003; Elliot 1999). For these reasons, the data allow for the most accurate assessment of the effect of social capital on job success for attorneys to date. In order to overcome the issue of missing cases, I used listwise deletion to drop every case where an individual did not answer all of the questions of interest in a given table.

#### **Dependent Variables**

In order to test how social capital affects lawyers' success the dependent variables consist of measures of job satisfaction, earnings, and clients acquired. One question assesses the clientele that the attorney personally recruited. This question asks, "How many clients did you personally bring into the firm last year?"<sup>8</sup> Individuals only answer this question if they have recruited at least one client. I recoded the missing data in this variable to zero indicating that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> I was originally going to use another client variable that assessed how much revenue the firm earned from their clientele but ultimately decided to throw the variable out because it drastically decreased the sample size. A small number of people actually answered this question, and after conducting the interview data, this appeared to be because very few attorneys were required to acquire clients and those who did acquire clients often did not know the amount of revenue their clients generated for the firm off the top of their heads.

participants had not recruited at least one client. In order to measure earnings, I analyze the question asking, "What is your total annual salary (before taxes) including estimated bonus, if applicable, at your current job?"<sup>9</sup> This is a fill in the blank question and is therefore a continuous dependent variable. I dropped all cases where individuals entered a zero as their income because only employed individuals fit into the scope of the theory. The total number of people dropped based on having no income was 29. I also measure job satisfaction with a composite index composed of the average of 17 questions, each ranging from 1-7 in satisfaction (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010). The list of questions measures how satisfied lawyers are with issues of recognition, responsibility, performance evaluation process, and value of work. The full list of questions can be found in Appendix B.<sup>10</sup> The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

## **Independent Variables**

This research will help explore the effect of professional, non-professional, and kinship social capital on the job success of black and white lawyers. I use a self-reported measure to assess the race/ethnicity of the participants. This question asks, "What is your racial/ethnic group? *Check all that apply*." The options include: Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Native American/American Indian, Asian/Pacific Islander, White, and Other. Because the theory only makes predictions for whites and blacks, all respondents who checked neither black nor white were dropped from the data. Eighteen respondents checked both white and black. I deleted these respondents from the data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> It is important to emphasize that the salary variable includes estimated bonuses. After conducting private interviews, I found that in large private firms, the annual salary is strictly determined by the amount of time at the firm whereas the bonus is a more subjective estimate of contribution to the firm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Composite job satisfaction questions for the full sample load with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.866 (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010).

I use several questions to measure social capital in the three main networks: professional, non-professional and family. Professional networks were measured using three questions for all types of attorneys. In the first question the survey asks participants whether or not they are likely to join partners (professional superiors) for meals on a recurring basis. Previous research using AJD data only among large corporate firms (firms with over 100 lawyers) show that 56% of white attorneys in large firms have eaten meals with partners whereas only 25% of blacks have joined partners for meals (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010). The next question asks whether or not they are likely to spend recreational time with associates (professional peers). The third question asks whether or not they would like to see more and better mentoring by their partners. Forty-seven percent of whites in large firms reported they would like to see better mentoring but 70% of blacks said the same (Payne-Pikus et al. 2010), suggesting that black attorneys in large firms may be receiving less, or less satisfying, mentoring than white attorneys. All three of these variables measure the respondent's perception of the quantity and quality of the social connections with their colleagues, and therefore their potential to create opportunities for the respondent to have access to resources, information and assistance from these colleagues.

Another question, which focuses on both professional and non-professional organizational activities, asks whether or not they participate in bar association activities, civic groups, or non-profit associations (all in one question; this is dummy coded so that 1=I do participate in these organizations and 0=I do not). In order to test the value and use of professional and non-professional networks to the individual I measure additional social capital variables. These social capital variables stem from the question, "This question is about possible assistance and support you may have received or be receiving at your job. For each of the listed aspects of your job, enter the number of the one or two most important source(s) of help to you, in the order of their

importance. Indicate the number (from the list below) of sources that have been of assistance to you in the following aspects of your job." The aspects of the job listed are: acquiring technical aspects of the job, learning firm/office protocols and customs, devising specific strategies for achieving career goals, receiving support and encouragement in stressful times, getting informal feedback on your performance, gaining valuable networking opportunities, having a personal advocate within the firm. The possible sources of support listed are: Formal training programs, a firm/office designated mentor, informal mentors at your firm or office, your immediate supervisor, colleagues at other firms/offices, non-lawyer colleagues, friends and family, peers, self-taught, other.

From this matrix of questions, I create five dummy variables. The first non-professional social capital variable measures those who say that their non-lawyer colleagues were the most influential people for them in gaining network opportunities (compared to those who do not). Two variables represent an emphasis on the professional networks: those who say that informal mentors were the most significant in gaining networking opportunities and those who say that colleagues were the most significant in gaining these opportunities. Another professional support variable represents those who say that mentors or colleagues at the job are most important for receiving support and encouragement in stressful times. In the assessment of prioritizing kinship social capital, I create a dummy variable from the question in which participants could indicate whether or not family and friends were their most significant source of support in stressful times on the job. Note that a significant strength of these variables is that they emphasize the *use*, rather than simply the existence, of social network resources. In other words, these variables measure whether or not respondents believe that they have actually received resources from their network, rather than simply counting the number of such ties that exist.

Next, participants are given a list of possible job-searching methods and asked to rank how important each group of people (on a scale of 1-7 where 7 is extremely important) were in helping them obtain their current job. These questions are lower quality measures of social capital than the measures described above, because they are asking individuals to report on what they think was important in getting their job, something that they may not know and information that is also retrospectively reported. Still, I examine these measures in order to include tests of what social capital the respondents in the survey *perceive* as important and useful, and in order to give context to my interviews, which are based entirely on the individuals' perceptions. They are measured in wave II of the data in order to make sure that the job hunt they are referring to is the one for their current job (because some respondents changed jobs between waves I and II). The options include family members, law school classmates, other friends or business associates, their law school's alumni network, direct contact with employer, hired following a summer position, response to an advertisement, direct unsolicited contact with the employer, and recommended by professor. I use this question to generate five social capital variables: three indicators of professional social capital, one of non-professional social capital and one of kinship social capital. The professional social capital dummy variables consist of: (1) those who entered a 5-7 for the importance of law school classmates; (2) those who entered 5-7 for their law school's alumni network and (3) those who entered 5-7 for being recommended by professor. Those who answered a 5-7 on the other friends or business associates options are dummy coded as receiving non-professional social capital. The kinship network dummy variable represents those who answered a 5-7 for family members. These variables are not mutually exclusive; a respondent can report finding multiple different networks very important to their job search.

### Controls

This study controls for several different variables that may simultaneously affect social capital and the outcome variables, income and job satisfaction. For the analysis of job satisfaction I control for job rewards and work values with two options from the stem question "What changes would you most like to see in your job?" I control for those who answer yes to the option for a "greater opportunity to make decisions on matters you're working on" as well as "greater opportunity to shape the future direction of the office/firm." These control variables are necessary to establish the validity of the relationship between social capital and job success.

Gender is another important variable that I control; research has shown that gender pay gaps persist among lawyers even after controlling for prestige of law school and other important factors like job commitment and job setting (Noonan et. al 2005). I also control for personal status variables such as grade point average and law firm size. <sup>11</sup> Law firm size was recoded into six categories. Those with 0-5 lawyers in their firm were placed into category 1, those with 6-10 lawyers were placed into category 2, those with 11-25 lawyers in their firm were placed into category 3, those with 26-50 lawyers in their firm were placed into category 4, those with 50-100 lawyers in their firm were placed into category 5, and over 100 were in category 6. Kim's (2009) research explains how this control significantly decreases the power of homophily explanations. Homophily occurs when. If there is still an effect of social capital on income amongst those of different prestige levels then one may conclude that this relationship is not simply due to similar individuals being together. If lower status individuals benefit from networks with others with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> I tested models with parental education as well but dropped the variable because of the high amount of missing data.

higher prestige, this cannot be interpreted as a homophily because the individuals benefitting from one another do not share the same characteristics.

## **Analysis Plan**

Before testing the hypotheses, my analysis begins with descriptive examinations of the levels of each type of social capital for whites and blacks in order to establish what racial differences in levels and types of social capital exist among attorneys. The descriptive data are weighted so that minority groups are representative to their proportions of the population. I did not weight the variables in the multivariate analysis in accordance with the recommendation from Dinovitzer et al. (2009). This is an important contribution because there is little information within sociology about the racial differences in social capital for a high-skill professional group. I conducted separate descriptive analyses of corporate attorneys versus all attorneys because the theoretical predictions of the effects of social capital on salary through the acquisition of clientele apply only to attorneys who work in private firms. Private firm attorneys are rewarded based largely on the income they generate for the firm through working on cases and bringing in clients, while attorneys in other contexts are generally not expected to recruit new clients, so hypotheses 1 A-B about the importance of social capital for client acquisition only apply to corporate attorneys (a complete list the hypotheses can be found in Appendix A).<sup>12</sup> I used OLS regressions to predict clientele, income and the index of job satisfaction. I measured the relationship between these clientele variables and salary. Finally, I tested the effect of professional social capital on salary amongst all types of attorneys in a test of hypothesis 1-C. The final model controlled for client acquisition to see if that explains the effects of social capital

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> As the subsequent analysis of the interviews in the next chapter shows, recruiting clients is only significant for attorneys in large firms at the senior (partner) level. Attorneys in large firms who are not partners are not yet responsible for recruiting clients; however those in small firms are always responsible for recruiting clients. Fourteen percent of private firm attorneys in wave I made partner by wave II.

on earnings.

In order to test hypothesis 2 and determine the racial difference in the value of social capital I add the non-professional social capital variables to the measures of use of non-lawyer colleagues and use of informal mentors as the most important factors that contribute to establishing networking opportunities to the model. I also add the professional social capital variables to the model. Each variable is dummy coded with the omitted category consisting of all the other options that were available as factors important to networking. I interact each of these variables with race in an OLS regression predicting earnings.

In order to test hypothesis 3, which states that involvement in large voluntary organizations positively affects earnings, I analyze the question of whether the individual participates at least monthly in either civic groups, bar associations, or non-profit associations (together in one question, dummy coded as 1=at least monthly participation). I use OLS regression to measure the effect of this variable on earnings (and I also test its relationship with clientele).

In order to assess hypothesis 4 that blacks who use social contacts are more likely to work in the public sector, I analyze a question asking how significant multiple connections were in obtaining their first job. The options included law school classmates, law school alumni associations, faculty recommendations, family members, and other business associates. I interact these variables with race then test their relationship with the probability of working in the private versus the public sector using a logistic regression model.

Next, I test hypothesis 5. This model tests the relationships of the professional social capital variables – meals with partners, recreation with associates, and desire for more mentoring – with the composite job satisfaction variable using an OLS model. In order to assess hypothesis 6 (that kinship and emotionally supportive professional social capital have a positive effect on

job satisfaction) I include the variable stating that family and friends have been the most important source of support in stressful times as well as those who said that colleagues at the office have been the most important source of support in stressful times. I dummy code each variable, with all of the other options as the omitted category. These independent variables are included in the model of composite job satisfaction in order to assess hypothesis 6. The final competing hypotheses (7-A and 7-B) about the effect of kinship networks on job satisfaction by race use the same kinship social capital variable for analysis as hypothesis 6, and I interact it with the Black dummy variable.

#### Results

Table 1 summarizes the variables of interest for lawyers in all job types. The descriptive data shown in table 1 below indicates the mean salary is just over \$101,000 while the mean job satisfaction was a composite score of 5.28 (on a scale of 1-7). The sample had an average firm category score of 4.25, which means that they were in the category of 26-50 lawyers in their firm.<sup>13</sup> The GPA variable was originally measured on a scale of 1-8, with 1 representing a grade point average ranging from 3.75-4.00 and 8 representing a grade point average of under 2.25. A nine indicated that subjects did not take any courses for which grades were given. These subjects were recoded as missing, and then I reverse coded GPA so that the higher number indicated a higher score and then recoded it to the midpoints of each GPA category so that the lowest category became a value of 1.13 and the highest category was 3.88. The mean GPA score for lawyers, using this recoded categorical variable, was 3.24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Appendix Table C.1 provides a table of the size of the private firms that black and white attorneys worked in at Waves I and II.

|  | Standard      |           |      |         |  |
|--|---------------|-----------|------|---------|--|
|  | Mean          | Deviation | Min  | Max     |  |
| Salary   | \$101,964     | 1,452     | 500  | 480,000 |  |
| Median Salary                                  | \$95,000      |           |      |         |  |
| Job Satisfaction                               | 5.28          | 0.27      | 1    | 7       |  |
| Controls                                       |               |           |      |         |  |
| Male   | 0.54          |           |      |         |  |
| Lawyers in Office (categ)                      | 4.25          | 0.09      | 1    | 11      |  |
| GPA in Law School                              | 3.24          | 0.11      | 1.13 | 3.88    |  |
| Want Opportunity to Make Decisions             | 0.22          |           |      |         |  |
| Want Opportunity to Shape Future               | 0.29          |           |      |         |  |
| Social Capital Variables                       |               |           |      |         |  |
| Clients Recruited                              | 6.38          | 0.35      | 1    | 11      |  |
| Meal with Partner                              | 54.9%         |           |      |         |  |
| Recreation with Associates                     | 64.5%         |           |      |         |  |
| Want More Mentoring                            | 47.5%         |           |      |         |  |
| Used Family to get Job                         | 19.8%         |           |      |         |  |
| Used Classmate to get Job                      | 8.0%          |           |      |         |  |
| Used Friends to get Job                        | 36.4%         |           |      |         |  |
| Used Professor to get Job                      | 5.3%          |           |      |         |  |
| Used Alumni Network to get Job                 | 5.1%          |           |      |         |  |
| Non-lawyer Colleagues and Networking           | 6.1%          |           |      |         |  |
| Informal Mentors and Networking                | 13.6%         |           |      |         |  |
| Colleagues and Networking                      | 23.8%         |           |      |         |  |
| Monthly Group Activities                       | 42.6%         |           |      |         |  |
| Support From Colleagues<br>Support From Family | 3.3%<br>53.7% |           |      |         |  |
|  | 55.770        |           |      |         |  |
| Race<br>Black                                  | 10.6%         |           |      |         |  |
| White  | 89.4%         |           |      |         |  |
| Job Type                                       | 02.170        |           |      |         |  |
| Private Law Firm (Wave II)                     | 50.0%         |           |      |         |  |

**Table 1.** Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital, Controls, Job Satisfaction, and Salary (Total N=3,400)

Attorneys in this sample turn to family rather than colleagues for their emotional support. About 54% of the sample received support from family in stressful times ("Support from family") compared to 3.3% who received support in stressful times from colleagues at the firm. Regarding the mentoring activities, over half of the participants went out for meals with or senior attorneys (55% percent). Much more of the sample has participated in recreational activities with other associates at 65%. Almost half of the sample would like to see more or better mentoring in their office. Sixty-six percent of the sample worked in a private firm in the first wave and this number reduced to 50% in wave II. This is in line with the pattern that lawyers tend to enter into corporate firms and then leave after a few years (Sterling and Reichman 2010). As for the nonprofessional and group affiliation social capital variables, using friends to get the current job was the most popular method in getting their current job. Thirty-nine percent of the sample explained that this method was the most instrumental in getting their current job. About 43% of the sample participated in voluntary group activities at least once per month. After dropping all of the nonwhite and non-black subjects the sample is 90% white and 10% black.

Table 2 summarizes the racial differences in the variables of interest for this study. This table provides mean differences in salary and shows that blacks have a mean income of \$99,590 whereas whites have a mean income of \$103,596. The median black income for all lawyers is less than whites at \$91,500 compared to \$95,000. This shows that blacks have a lower salary than whites, although the difference is not statistically significant. Because the attorneys in this sample are still relatively early into their careers, the salary differences are less robust than expected. Blacks have a job satisfaction score that is marginally significantly lower than whites' satisfaction at 5.14 compared to 5.28 (t=-1.588; p=0.056). Fifty-five percent of the whites in the sample are men compared to 38% of the blacks, which is an important demographic difference

| Race  | White       | Black             | White     | Black      |
|---|-------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|
|   | Mean        | Mean              | Range     | Range      |
|   |             |                   | 500-      | 5,995-     |
| Salary  | \$103,596   | \$99,590          | 480,000   | 300,000    |
|   | (1,521)     | (3,698)           |           |            |
| Median Salary                                   | \$95,000    | \$91,500          |           |            |
| Job Satisfaction                                | 5.28        | 5.14+             | 1-7       | 1.06-7     |
|   | (1.04)      | (1.06)            |           |            |
| Controls  |             | ()                |           |            |
| Male  | 0.55        | 0.38              |           |            |
| Lawyers in Office (categ)                       | 4.23        | 4.65              | 1-11      | 1-11       |
| Lawyers in Office (categ)                       | 4.23 (0.09) | (0.32)            | 1-11      | 1-11       |
|   | . ,         | . ,               | 1 12 2 00 | 1 1 2 2 00 |
| GPA in Law School                               | 3.25        | 2.96***           | 1.13-3.88 | 1.13-3.88  |
| Went Ong'to to Make Desiring                    | (0.37)      | (0.50)            |           |            |
| Want Opp'ty to Make Decisions                   | 0.22        | 0.26              |           |            |
| Want Opp'ty to Shape Future                     | 0.29        | 0.22+             |           |            |
| Social Capital Variables<br>Clients Recruited   | 6.89        | 6.34              | 0-480     | 0-500      |
| Clients Recruited                               |             |                   | 0-480     | 0-500      |
| Maal with Danta an                              | (3.21)      | (0.66)<br>0.38*** |           |            |
| Meal with Partner<br>Recreation with Associates | 0.55        |                   |           |            |
|   | 0.64        | 0.67              |           |            |
| Want More Mentoring                             | 0.48        | 0.36+             |           |            |
| Used Family to get Job                          | 0.19        | 0.15              |           |            |
| Used Classmate Job                              | 0.08        | 0.08              |           |            |
| Used Friends to get Job                         | 0.36        | 0.38              |           |            |
| Used Professor to Job                           | 0.05        | 0.07              |           |            |
| Used Alumni Network to get Job                  | 0.05        | 0.04              |           |            |
| Non-Lawyer Colleagues and                       | 0.07        | 0.05              |           |            |
| Networking                                      | 0.06        | 0.05              |           |            |
| Informal Mentors and Networking                 | 0.14        | 0.08*             |           |            |
| Colleagues and Networking                       | 0.24        | 0.24              |           |            |
| Monthly Group Activities                        | 0.42        | 0.49              |           |            |
| Support From Colleagues                         | 0.03        | 0.06              |           |            |
| Support From Family                             | 0.54        | 0.54              |           |            |
| Job Type  | 0.50        | 0.0.1.4.4.4       |           |            |
| Private Law Firm (Wave II)                      | 0.50        | 0.34***           |           |            |

 Table 2. Weighted Descriptive Statistics with Racial Differences (Total N=3,40)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

2-tailed T-test of differences between whites and blacks

between these groups, especially given the lower income of female attorneys compared to male attorneys (Noonan et al. 2005). It is important to keep in mind that the majority of the blacks in this sample are women; this population may be affected differently by social capital than men in addition to their wage disadvantage. Blacks have a significantly lower GPA than whites with an average of 2.96 compared to 3.25 (t=-8.053; p<0.001).

A two-group test of proportions to test for significant differences between white and black proportions demonstrated important differences in black and white levels of social capital. Overall, whites were significantly more likely to join partners or senior associates for meals than blacks (whites=0.38; blacks=0.55; Z<0.001). Secondly, blacks were overall marginally more likely than whites to desire more or better mentoring (whites=0.36; blacks=0.48; Z<0.1). Blacks were also less likely than whites to have used informal mentors to gain networking opportunities. Lastly, blacks were significantly less likely to work in a private firm than whites. This finding supports Wilkins and Gulati's (1996) theory explaining that black attorneys do not stay in the private sector.

Table 3 examines the descriptive statistics of whites and blacks in corporate firms only, excluding solo practice, government settings and all other types. I focus some of my hypotheses on lawyers in corporate firms because they represent the most lucrative segment of the profession and contain a disproportionately low number of blacks (Dinovitzer 2004). Fewer blacks work in private firms than whites.<sup>14</sup> As table 2 displays, 34% of blacks compared to 50% of whites work in private firms. However, the few blacks who do work in private firms earn as much as whites who work in firms. Blacks earned a mean salary of \$126,318 (however this difference is not statistically significant). The median

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Appendix Table C.1 provides a table of the size of the private firms that black and white attorneys worked in at Waves I and II.

difference in pay is about \$5,000 with blacks at \$120,000 and whites at \$115,000. The racial differences in GPA are similar to that of the larger sample. In the overall data the average GPA of black attorneys was significantly lower than the average GPA for whites (black= 2.96; white= 3.25). Amongst private firm lawyers the average GPA for blacks is also significantly lower than whites at 3.09 compared to 3.33 (t=-3.591; p<0.001). This is somewhat consistent with Sander's theory that affirmative action allows blacks with lower GPAs to be recruited by prestigious, large law firms (Sander 2006), although it is important to note that the average GPA for those who work in firms is still higher for each racial group than the overall average GPA for the group. The data also tell an interesting story about job satisfaction. Black private firm lawyers earned salaries equal to their white peers but they were significantly less satisfied in their jobs (black job satisfaction=4.88; white job satisfaction= 5.23; t=-1.822; p<0.05). Blacks in private firms had a higher number of clients that they personally recruited than whites at 26 compared to 12. Also, they were significantly less likely than whites to want more opportunity to shape their future at their firms, suggesting that their lower job satisfaction is not a result of feeling more powerless in their firms.

The social capital differences in private firms indicate that blacks are less connected to informal mentors, and possibly less likely to use social ties to get their job. Blacks at a private firm were less likely to credit informal mentors as being the most important aspect in establishing network connections than whites (whites=0.15; blacks=0.02; Z<0.05). Finally, the proportion of blacks using family and colleagues to get their first job was marginally lower than whites. Blacks at a private firm were also marginally less likely to have used their family connections to get their current job. Overall, there is no evidence to support hypothesis 1-A; none of the social capital variables have a significant effect on client acquisition. The control

| Race                               | White     | Black     | White         | Black         |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|
|                                    | Mean      | Mean      | Range<br>500- | Range 65,000- |
| Salary                             | \$126,318 | \$127,205 | 480,000       | 215,000       |
|                                    | (2,486)   | (6,990)   |               |               |
| Median Salary                      | 115,000   | 120,000   |               |               |
| Job Satisfaction                   | 5.23      | 4.88*     | 1-7           | 1.90-7        |
|                                    | (0.04)    | (0.15)    |               |               |
| Controls                           |           |           |               |               |
| Male                               | 0.59      | 0.48      |               |               |
| Lawyers in Office (categ)          | 5.26      | 5.99      | 1-11          | 1-11          |
|                                    | (0.13)    | (0.50)    |               |               |
| GPA in Law School                  | 3.33      | 3.09***   | 1.13-3.88     | 2.62-3.62     |
|                                    | (0.34)    | (0.31)    |               |               |
| Want Opportunity to Make Decisions | 0.23      | 0.19      |               |               |
| Want Opportunity to Shape Future   | 0.29      | 0.08***   |               |               |
| Social Capital Variables           | ••=>      |           |               |               |
| Clients Recruited                  | 11.81     | 25.77     | 0-400         | 0-500         |
|                                    | (1.65)    | (21.19)   |               |               |
| Meal with Partner                  | 0.64      | 0.61      |               |               |
| Recreation with Associates         | 0.66      | 0.69      |               |               |
| Want More Mentoring                | 0.48      | 0.35      |               |               |
| Used Family to get Job             | 0.18      | 0.08 +    |               |               |
| Used Classmate to get Job          | 0.09      | 0.05      |               |               |
| Used Friends to get Job            | 0.32      | 0.31      |               |               |
| Used Professor to get Job          | 0.05      | 0.02+     |               |               |
| Table 3. Continued                 |           |           |               |               |
| Used Alumni to get Job             | 0.07      | 0.08      |               |               |
| Non-Lawyer Colleagues and          | 0.07      | 0.00      |               |               |
| Networking                         | 0.07      | 0.08      |               |               |
| Informal Mentors and Networking    | 0.15      | 0.02***   |               |               |
| Colleagues and Networking          | 0.20      | 0.11      |               |               |
| Monthly Group Activities           | 0.43      | 0.43      |               |               |
| Support from Colleagues            | 0.02      | 0.09      |               |               |
| Support from Family                | 0.56      | 0.68      |               |               |

**Table 3.** Weighted Descriptive Statistics with Racial Differences (Private firms only; N=911)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

2-tailed T-test of differences between whites and blacks

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%
variables show that men and those with lower GPAs recruited more clients than women and those with higher GPAs. The GPA finding is particularly surprising. One possible explanation is that attorneys with higher GPAs recruit a small number of clients that represent lucrative companies rather a large number of clients who are low status individuals.

# Testing Hypotheses Related to Earnings

There are mixed results for hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1-A states that professional and nonprofessional social capital contribute to greater client acquisition. This hypothesis is specifically for those in the private firms because this is the professional setting that is most dependent on client acquisition. Table 4 shows the results of an OLS regression model of the effect of social capital variables on client acquisition amongst corporate lawyers. This table examines the total number of clients recruited. The table has a total of four models. Models 1 and 2 examine the effects of just professional social capital variables and race on client recruitment while models 3 and 4 add on the effect of non-professional social capital variables. Race is entered as a dummy variable and whites are the omitted category. These models show no significant racial gap in client acquisition, and no significant relationship between social capital and client acquisition. Model 2 adds the controls to the professional social capital variables and shows no relationship between professional social capital variables and client acquisition.

Results for hypothesis 1-B in Table 5 do not support the notion that more clients have a direct impact on salary either (a finding that we will return to in the qualitative results, which help to explain why this is the case). Hypothesis 1-B posited that the number of clients acquired is positively related to salary. Tables 5 and 6 analyze the data with private firm lawyers only. Models 1 and 2 from table 5 examine the effects of the number of clients with and without controls on salary. Number of clients acquired shows no significant correlation with salary

|   | Model 1  | Model 2  | Model 3  | Model 4  |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Race  |          |          |          |          |
| Black                                       | -9.294   | -11.045  | -8.978   | -10.409  |
|   | (9.702)  | (9.787)  | (9.762)  | (9.839)  |
| Non-Professional Social Capital             |          |          |          |          |
| Informal Networks Established Connections   |          |          | -2.709   | 1.113    |
|   |          |          | (5.859)  | (5.769)  |
| Non-lawyer Contacts Established Connections |          |          | 7.761    | 6.883    |
|   |          |          | (8.209)  | (7.983)  |
| Professional Social Capital                 |          |          |          |          |
| Meal with Partner                           | 4.483    | 0.684    | 4.439    | 0.498    |
|   | (4.558)  | (4.509)  | (4.574)  | (4.534)  |
| Recreation with Associates                  | -6.324   | -3.449   | -5.911   | -3.712   |
|   | (4.771)  | (4.686)  | (4.800)  | (4.711)  |
| Table 4. Continued                          |          |          |          |          |
| Want More Mentoring                         | -5.025   | -5.979   | -5.218   | -6.046   |
|   | (5.540)  | (4.242)  | (4.368)  | (4.254)  |
| Controls                                    |          |          |          |          |
| Male  |          | 8.999*   |          | 9.031*   |
|   |          | (4.280)  |          | (4.289)  |
| Lawyers in Office                           |          | -1.893*  |          | -1.876*  |
|   |          | (0.683)  |          | (4.289)  |
| GPA in Law School                           |          | -14.643* |          | -14.731* |
|   |          | (7.393)  |          | (7.455)  |
| Constant                                    | 14.985** | 70.386** | 14.651** | 69.918** |
|   | (5.540)  | (24.936) | (5.629)  | (25.124) |
| Observations                                | 325      | 325      | 325      | 325      |
| R-Squared                                   | 0.017    | 0.082    | 0.021    | 0.085    |

**Table 4.** Hypothesis 1-A: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital on Clients Recruited (Private Firms Only)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

This result appears to show no support for hypothesis 1-B. Control variables have the expected relationships (i.e. salaries are higher for men, those in larger law firms and those who had higher GPAs in law school).

|                   | Model 1   | Model 2   |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Clients Recruited | -0.001    | 0.001     |
|                   | (0.001)   | (0.001)   |
| Controls          |           |           |
| Male              |           | 0.184***  |
|                   |           | (0.039)   |
| Lawyers in Office |           | 0.078***  |
|                   |           | (0.006)   |
| GPA in Law School |           | 0.199***  |
|                   |           | (0.059)   |
| Black             |           | 0.063     |
|                   |           | (0.087)   |
| Constant          | 11.668*** | 10.251*** |
|                   | (0.018)   | (0.237)   |
| Observations      | 419       | 419       |
| R-Squared         | 0.037     | 0.369     |

**Table 5.** Hypothesis 1-B: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Clients on Log of Salary (Private Firms Only)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

Table 6 takes a closer look at hypothesis 1-B by examining the relationship between salaries and *types* of clients for corporate lawyers, from high-income clients, low-income clients, Fortune 500 clients, large and small business clients, insurance company clients, and nonprofit clients. Three models test the relationship between client types and salary for corporate attorneys. Results reveal that having clients who are non-profit companies has a marginally significant negative relationship with salary in models 2 and 3 (B=-.004; s=0.019; p<0.1). These variables in these models have a high level of data that are missing at random. Using listwise deletion to account for the missing data drastically reduced the N of table 6 to 82. In tables not shown, I imputed the missing data using multiple imputations in Stata. Those results show a significantly

| Log of Salary (Private Firms Only) | Model 1   | Model 2   | Model 3   |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Number of Clients                  | Iviouel 1 | iviouel 2 | 0.004     |
| Number of Clients                  |           |           | (0.003)   |
|                                    |           |           | (0.003)   |
| High Income Clients                | 0.001     | 0.002     | 0.003     |
|                                    | (0.003)   | (0.002)   | (0.002)   |
| Insurance Companies                | 0.0001    | 0.002     | 0.002     |
|                                    | (0.002)   | (0.001)   | (0.001)   |
| Middle Income Clients              | -0.001    | -0.003    | -0.001    |
|                                    | (0.003)   | (0.002)   | (0.003)   |
| Fortune 500 Companies              | 0.015     | 0.015     | 0.002     |
| <b>^</b>                           | (0.009)   | (0.009)   | (0.004)   |
| Large Businesses                   | 0.001     | 0.001     | 0.001     |
|                                    | (0.001)   | (0.001)   | (0.001)   |
| Medium Sized Businesses            | -0.0004   | -0.001    | .0001     |
|                                    | (0.004)   | (0.002)   | (0.001)   |
| Small Businesses                   | 0.001     | 0.004     | .0004     |
|                                    | (0.002)   | (0.003)   | (0.003)   |
| Government Clients                 | 0.003     | 0.002     | 0.003     |
|                                    | (0.002)   | (0.002)   | (0.001)   |
| Non-Profit Companies               | -0.039    | -0.049+   | -0.004+   |
|                                    | (0.023)   | (0.023)   | (0.019)   |
| Similar Group                      | -0.019    | 0.099     | 0.031     |
|                                    | (0.056)   | (0.025)   | (0.112)   |
| Other Clients                      | -0.002    | -0.002    | -0.002    |
|                                    | (0.001)   | (0.001)   | (0.002)   |
| Controls                           |           |           |           |
| Male                               |           | 0.046     | 0.162+    |
|                                    |           | (0.112)   | (0.044)   |
| Lawyers in Office                  |           | 0.068***  | 0.077***  |
|                                    |           | (0.019)   | (0.015)   |
| GPA in Law School                  |           | 0.065     | 0.163     |
|                                    |           | (0.213)   | (0.087)   |
| Constant                           | 11.318*** | 10.356*** | 10.612*** |
|                                    | (0.239)   | (0.282)   | (0.025)   |
| Observations                       | 82        | 82        | 82        |
| R-squared                          | 0.382     | 0.522     | 0.538     |
| it oquatou                         | 0.304     | 0.544     | 0.550     |

**Table 6.** Hypothesis 1-B: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Types of Clients on Log of Salary (Private Firms Only)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses + Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

positive relationship between the time spent representing Fortune 500 companies and salary even after adding controls. These results suggest that the more time a lawyer spends representing less lucrative companies, the lower their salary is likely to be. This is likely because non-profit companies are not as profitable like Fortune 500 companies, and they are less likely to pay high rates for services as Fortune 500 companies. The data indicate that representing non-profit clients are negatively correlated with an individual's salary.

Table 7 measures the effect of these same social capital variables on salary amongst all types of lawyers and private lawyers separately. The results show partial support for hypothesis 1-C (social capital has a direct effect on salary, but models not shown demonstrate the relationship is not explained by social capital's effect on recruiting clientele). Models 1 and 2 represent the effect of social capital variables on salary amongst lawyers in private firms only. Models 3 and 4 represent the effect of social capital variables on salary for lawyers in all types of firms. In model 3, recreation with associates positively predicted salary (B=0.214; s=0.048; p<0.001) without controls for the number of clients and other controls for individual characteristics. The positive effects of spending recreational time with associates remained even after adding the control variables. Eating meals with a partner is also positively associated with salary in this model (B=0.090; s=0.044; p<0.05). The positive effect of eating a meal with a partner was eliminated by the control variables for the sample of all attorneys. In looking at attorneys in private firms with no controls, eating a meal with a partner does not have an effect on salary. However, after adding the controls in model 2, eating a meal with a partner shows a significant positive effect on salary for private firm attorneys. In models not shown, adding the number of clients acquired failed to eliminate the positive effect of these social capital variables.

This shows a lack of evidence that client acquisition mediates the relationship between social capital and income.

|                             | Models 1-2=I | Private Firms | Models 3-4= | All Lawyers |
|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
|                             | Model 1      | Model 2       | Model 3     | Model 4     |
| Professional Social Capital |              |               |             |             |
| Meal with Partner           | 0.083        | 0.121**       | 0.090*      | 0.048       |
|                             | (0.05)       | (0.042)       | (0.044)     | (0.038)     |
| Recreation with Associates  | 0.168**      | 0.074 +       | 0.214***    | 0.116**     |
|                             | (0.056)      | (0.045)       | (0.048)     | (0.046)     |
| More Mentoring              | 0.037        | 0.028         | -0.020      | -0.012      |
|                             | (0.051)      | (0.040)       | (0.044)     | (0.041)     |
| Controls                    |              |               |             |             |
| Male                        |              | 0.123***      |             | 0.224***    |
|                             |              | (0.038)       |             | (0.006)     |
| Lawyers in Office           |              | 0.075***      |             | 0.059***    |
|                             |              | (0.006)       |             | (0.006)     |
| GPA in Law School           |              | 0.194**       |             | 0.335***    |
|                             |              | (0.066)       |             | (0.088)     |
| Constant                    | 11.454***    | 10.367***     | 11.271***   | 9.865***    |
|                             | (0.047)      | (0.244)       | (0.054)     | (0.360)     |
| Observations                | 327          | 327           | 643         | 643         |
| R-squared                   | 0.034        | 0.407         | 0.035       | 0.278       |

**Table 7.** Hypothesis 1-C: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital on Log of

 Salary

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

Investigating which control variables explain the relationship between social capital and salary for private firm attorneys, when GPA in law school alone was placed in the model with the social capital variables, eating a meal with a partner became significant. Likewise, when the number of lawyers in office alone was placed in the model with the social capital variables, eating a meal with a partner became significant. However, when male alone was placed in the

model, eating a meal with partner remained insignificant. This implies that among private firm attorneys, when taking into account GPAs and firm size, eating meals with partners is correlated with a significant increase salary. From these results, I find partial support for hypothesis 1-C because number of clients did not mediate the effect of the social capital variables on income but social capital is positively correlated with salary for private firm attorneys. Importantly, it is not only social capital with senior colleagues but also connections with peers that are related to salary. This suggests that significance of the flow of information through peers as well.

Hypothesis 2 incorporates the interaction of race and social capital. It has competing predictions; either blacks who use social capital will have greater earnings than blacks who do not use social capital or blacks who use social capital will have lower earnings than blacks who do not use social capital compared to whites. Table 8 uses four models with OLS regression analyses of salary with social capital and racial interactions, with and without controls (amongst corporate lawyers and then again with all types of attorneys). This table shows multiple social capital variables to be significant predictors of salary. According to model 3, those who described informal mentors as the most important factors in gaining network opportunities had significantly higher incomes without the controls variables. Additionally, those who used their colleagues establish networking connections had a lower salary than those who did not, and those who spent recreational time with their colleagues had a higher salary than those who did not. Adding the control variables in model 4 explained this effect. These effects are explained by demographic differences between the groups.

| Social Capital on Log of Salary           | Models 1-2=Private |           | Models 3-4=All |          |
|---|--------------------|-----------|----------------|----------|
|   | Firms              |           | Lawyers        |          |
| Non-Professional Social Capital           | Model 1            | Model 2   | Model 3        | Model 4  |
| Informal Networks Established Connections | 0.135+             | 0.160     | 0.149*         | 0.085    |
|   | (0.074)            | (0.106)   | (0.068)        | (0.099)  |
| Colleagues Used to Establish Contacts     | -0.225*            | -0.119*   | -0.126*        | -0.047   |
|   | (0.072)            | (0.057)   | (0.063)        | (0.082)  |
| Non-lawyer Contacts Used to Make          |                    |           |                |          |
| Connections                               | 0.045              | -0.119    | 0.128          | -0.072   |
|   | (0.087)            | (0.138)   | (0.085)        | (0.138)  |
| Professional Social Capital               |                    |           |                |          |
| Meal with Partner                         | 0.097 +            | 0.143**   | 0.086 +        | 0.076    |
|   | (0.057)            | (0.046)   | (0.049)        | (0.071)  |
| Recreation with Associates                | 0.119+             | 0.056     | 0.184***       | 0.072    |
|   | (0.061)            | (0.048)   | (0.054)        | (0.075)  |
| More Mentoring                            | 0.047              | 0.011     | -0.029         | -0.012   |
|   | (0.054)            | (0.079)   | (0.049)        | (0.068)  |
| Race and Interactions                     |                    | . ,       | . ,            |          |
| Black                                     | -0.319             | 0.361     | -0.028         | 0.172    |
|   | (0.331)            | (0.442)   | (0.042)        | (0.439)  |
| Blacks Getting Meals with Partners        | -0.007             | 0.114     | -0.194         | -0.102   |
| -   | (0.269)            | (0.386)   | (0.144)        | (0.332)  |
| Black Recreation with Associates          | 0.0742             | -0.397    | -0.0109        | -0.124   |
|   | (0.247)            | (0.383)   | (0.121)        | (0.301)  |
| Blacks Who Need More Mentoring            | 0.252              | -0.108    | 0.135          | 0.099    |
|   | (0.229)            | (0.382)   | (0.129)        | (0.318)  |
| Blacks Using Informal Networks            | 0.608              |           | 0.0249         | 0.192    |
|   | (0.525)            |           | (0.207)        | (0.343)  |
| Blacks Using Colleagues to Get a Job      | 0.394              |           | 0.008          | 0.041    |
|   | (0.394)            |           | (0.175)        | (0.343)  |
| Controls                                  |                    |           |                |          |
| Male                                      |                    | 0.233***  |                | 0.233*** |
|   |                    | (0.042)   |                | (0.042)  |
| Lawyers in Office                         |                    | 0.076***  |                | 0.060*** |
|   |                    | (0.007)   |                | (0.006)  |
| GPA in Law School                         |                    | 0.168*    |                | 0.301*** |
| ~   |                    | (0.073)   |                | (0.059)  |
| Constant                                  | 11.45***           | 10.432*** | 11.261***      | 9.973*** |
|   | (0.069)            | (0.244)   | (0.054)        | (0.360)  |
| Observations                              | 289                | 289       | 559            | 559      |
| R-squared                                 | 0.102              | 0.455     | 0.061          | 0.292    |

**Table 8.** Hypothesis 2: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Racial Interactions in

 Social Capital on Log of Salary

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

Amongst private firm attorneys, those who described their office colleagues as their most significant source of gaining networking opportunities had a significantly lower salary than those who did not. For private firm attorneys, those who ate meals with partners continued to have an increase in salary even after adding controls. This effect has greater significance amongst private firm attorneys; the effect decreases to marginal and non-significance for all types of attorneys. Spending recreational time with associates also increased salary for attorneys all types of offices, but this effect disappeared after adding the control variables. Several of the interactions with the black variable in model 2 had to be omitted from the analysis because of collinearity with other variables.

This result does not support hypothesis 2-A or 2-B because blacks who used professional and non-professional social capital were not significantly different from whites who used social capital; there was no significant racial gap, and no significant interactions between race and the social capital measures. Table 8 does show, however, that professional and non-professional social capital are both related to salary for attorneys inside and outside of private law firms, although the relationships are more stable for those who work in private law firms.

Surprisingly, the results show no support for hypothesis 3. This hypothesis states that individuals involved with group activities will have a higher salary than those who are not. Table 9 tests the effect of participating in monthly group activities with several different voluntary organizations such as political parties, bar associations, or clubs etc. on salary using OLS regression and the results show a significant relationship. Results from model 1 show a significant negative relationship between monthly group activities and salary. This result may be due to the demanding time commitments of some voluntary organizations cutting into the demands of the job or it may be due to the aggregation of many different types of activities into a single measure of organizational participation. In the full model (model 2) the results are less conclusive because the negative relationship between involvements in monthly group activities was only marginally significant for the main effect (B=-0.031, s=0.039, p<0.1), with an insignificant interaction with black identification. Being involved in voluntary organizations may work differently between private firm attorneys and government attorneys only.

|                                    | Model 1   | Model 2   |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Monthly Group Activities           | -0.116**  | -0.031+   |
|                                    | (0.042)   | (0.039)   |
|                                    |           |           |
| Black                              |           | 0.006     |
|                                    |           | (0.092)   |
| Blacks in Monthly Group Activities |           | 0.194     |
|                                    |           | (0.141)   |
| Male                               |           | 0.229***  |
|                                    |           | (0.035)   |
| Lawyers in Office                  |           | 0.061***  |
|                                    |           | (0.051)   |
| GPA in Law School                  |           | 0.353***  |
|                                    |           | (0.052)   |
| Constant                           | 11.505*** | 10.027*** |
|                                    | (0.028)   | (0.173)   |
| Observations                       | 707       | 707       |
| R-Squared                          | 0.010     | 0.263     |

**Table 9.** Hypothesis 3: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Involvement

 in Large Organizations on Salary

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

In models not shown, I tested the effect of monthly group activities on salary amongst private firm attorneys. Results showed no significant relationship between monthly group activities and income.

The results somewhat contradict hypothesis 4, which states that blacks who use social capital are more likely than whites to work in the public sector rather than the private sector. Table 10 presents the results of a logistic regression model testing the effect of social capital variables, race and interactions between race and social capital on the probability of working in the private sector. Model 1 shows that blacks are overall less likely than whites to work in the private sector (B=-0.562; s=0.231; p<0.05), but there are no strongly significant interactions between race and type of social capital used (although there is weak evidence for an interaction with using friends to get a job). The control variables in model 2 mediate the difference in race in table 11. Model 2 also indicates that those who used their friends or a professor to get their job are less likely to work in the private sector. Also, those who used their alumni networks to get their current job were more likely to work in the private sector than the public sector. These results indicate that the type of social capital used may have the ability to decrease racial differences in lawyers in private firms. The alumni association stands out as the significant positive predictor of income because of its size and status range. These alumni networks can contain hundreds of individuals in a variety of types of positions. Therefore, this network is more likely to contain individuals that have connections to the more lucrative jobs in the private sector. There is marginal evidence that blacks who used their friends to get their job were more likely to work in the private sector. This suggests that blacks who use their social capital networks may be more likely to work in the more lucrative private sector.

In addition to the findings from the analyses, two variables consistently appeared as positive predictors of salary in attorneys throughout the tables. First, males consistently earned higher salaries than women. Second, the number of attorneys in the office or firm was consistently associated with a higher salary except in samples of corporate lawyers that control for professional and non-professional social capital. This implies that social capital helps to explain the effects of being in a larger firm because of the variety of possibilities in relationships that can form in these careers.

| Social Capital                 | Model 1  | Model 2  |  |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------|--|
| Used Professor to Get Job      | -0.482*  | -0.694*  |  |
|                                | (0.236)  | (0.293)  |  |
| Used Family to Get Job         | -0.142   | 0.144    |  |
|                                | (0.141)  | (0.182)  |  |
| Used Classmate to Get Job      | 0.053    | 0.452    |  |
|                                | (0.198)  | (0.412)  |  |
| Used Friends to Get Job        | -0.384** | -0.343*  |  |
|                                | (0.110)  | (0.143)  |  |
| Used Alumni Network to Get Job | 0.474*   | 0.740*   |  |
|                                | (0.238)  | (0.338)  |  |
| Interactions                   | . ,      |          |  |
| Black                          | -0.562*  | -0.949   |  |
|                                | (0.231)  | (0.584)  |  |
| Blacks Who Used Professors     | -0.394   |          |  |
|                                | (0.829)  |          |  |
| Blacks Who Used Family         | 0.118    | 0.391    |  |
|                                | (0.514)  | (0.041)  |  |
| Blacks Who Used Friends        | 0.297    | 0.844 +  |  |
|                                | (0.356)  | (0.481)  |  |
| Blacks Who Used Alumni Network | -0.451   | -0.209   |  |
|                                | (0.742)  | (1.359)  |  |
| Controls                       |          | 0.010    |  |
| Male                           |          | 0.213    |  |
|                                |          | (0.207)  |  |
| GPA in Law School              |          | 0.612*** |  |
|                                | 0 201*** | (0.302)  |  |
| Constant                       | 0.301*** | -0.351*  |  |
|                                | (0.072)  | 0.145    |  |
| Observations                   | 1,043    | 1,043    |  |
| Pseudo R-Squared               | 0.017    | 0.059    |  |

**Table 10.** Hypothesis 4: Logistic Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital on the

 Probability of Being in the Private Sector

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

## Testing Hypotheses Related to Job Satisfaction

Turning to the analyses of job satisfaction, the results also provide some evidence for the significance of social capital in creating job satisfaction. Hypothesis 5 predicted that professional and non-professional social capital would positively predict job satisfaction. Table 11 reports the results of two OLS regression models of the effect of professional social capital variables on job satisfaction. The table shows that wanting more mentoring was significantly and negatively correlated with job satisfaction (B=-0.183; s=0.078; p<0.05) even after controlling for other variables like job rewards. According to this result, as expected, those who desired more or better mentoring on their jobs tend to be less satisfied with it, although the interaction shows that this relationship does not vary by race. This finding provides evidence that perceptions of mentor relationships are significant in determining job satisfaction. It is interesting to note that size of firm was also negatively associated with satisfaction.

Table 12 reports results that test hypotheses 6 and 7 by conducting an OLS regression analysis of the effect of kinship social capital and interactions between race and social capital on job satisfaction. Hypothesis 6 states that kinship social capital is correlated with job satisfaction. Models 1 and 2 test hypothesis 6 and show no support; those who use family to help in stressful times do not have significantly higher levels of job satisfaction. The kinship social capital variable alone did not have an effect on job satisfaction. Hypothesis 7 addressed the racial differences for the effect of kinship social capital on job satisfaction with two competing hypothesis that either blacks with higher kinship social capital would have more job satisfaction (7-A) or less job satisfaction (7-B) compared to whites. Results do not support hypotheses 7 A or B. The tables testing the job satisfaction models show that the primary determinants of salary are not strongly related to job satisfaction. Only the professional social capital variable, wanting more mentoring, significantly predicts job satisfaction. I find no support for racial differences in

|                                | Model 1  | Model 2   |  |
|--------------------------------|----------|-----------|--|
| Job Rewards                    |          |           |  |
| Opportunity to Make Decisions  |          | -0.087    |  |
|                                |          | (0.161)   |  |
| Opportunity to Shape Future    |          | -0.141    |  |
|                                |          | (0.083)   |  |
| Professional Social Capital    |          |           |  |
| Meal with Partner              | 0.075    | 0.087     |  |
|                                | (0.064)  | (0.104)   |  |
| Recreation with Associates     | -0.023   | -0.005    |  |
|                                | (0.067)  | (0.108)   |  |
| More Mentoring                 | -0.174*  | -0.183*   |  |
| C C                            | (0.075)  | (0.078)   |  |
| Controls                       |          |           |  |
| Male                           |          | 0.027     |  |
|                                |          | (0.075)   |  |
| Lawyers in Office              |          | -0.046*** |  |
|                                |          | (0.011)   |  |
| GPA in Law School              |          | 0.213+    |  |
|                                |          | (0.109)   |  |
| Interactions                   |          |           |  |
| Black                          | -0.061   | 0.008     |  |
|                                | (0.113)  | (0.369)   |  |
| Blacks who Want More Mentoring |          | -0.013    |  |
|                                |          | (0.337)   |  |
| Constant                       | 5.331*** | 5.583***  |  |
|                                | (0.073)  | (0.228)   |  |
| Observations                   | 715      | 715       |  |
| R-Squared                      | 0.009    | 0.037     |  |

**Table 11.** Hypothesis 5: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital

 on Job Satisfaction

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

social capital contributing to differences in job satisfaction. However, the results show that mentoring may make an individual more satisfied on the job.<sup>15</sup>

| Capital on Job Satisfaction  |              |           |              |          |          |
|------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------|----------|
|                              | Hypothesis 6 |           | Hypothesis 7 |          |          |
|                              | Model 1      | Model 2   | Model 3      | Model 4  | Model 5  |
| Social Capital               |              |           |              |          |          |
| Support From Family          | 0.024        | 0.036     | -0.016       | 0.003    | 0.049    |
|                              | (0.075)      | (0.074)   | (0.074)      | (0.059)  | (0.118)  |
| Support From Colleagues      | 0.106        | 0.111     |              |          |          |
|                              | (0.213)      | (0.218)   |              |          |          |
| Controls                     |              |           |              |          |          |
| Male                         |              | -0.228    |              |          | -0.224   |
|                              |              | (0.074)   |              |          | (0.073)  |
| Lawyers in Office            |              | -0.047*** |              |          | -0.0003  |
|                              |              | (0.011)   |              |          | (0.0003) |
| GPA in Law School            |              | 0.293**   |              |          | 0.203+   |
|                              |              | (0.107)   |              |          | (0.105)  |
| Opportunity to Make          |              |           |              |          |          |
| Decisions                    |              | -0.094    |              |          | -0.097   |
|                              |              | (0.143)   |              |          | (0.143)  |
| Opportunity to Shape         |              |           |              |          |          |
| Future                       |              | 0.132     |              |          | 0.113    |
| <b>Race and Interactions</b> |              | (0.127)   |              |          | (0.128)  |
| Blacks                       |              | -0.135    | -0.206       | -0.016   | 0.177    |
|                              |              | (0.302)   | (0.134)      | (0.142)  | (0.414)  |
| Blacks who Get Support From  | n Family     |           |              | -0.397   | -0.479   |
|                              |              |           |              | (0.270)  | (0.438)  |
| Constant                     | 5.281***     | 4.517***  | 5.311***     | 5.293*** | 4.506*** |
|                              | (0.044)      | (0.379)   | (0.043)      | (0.044)  | (0.582)  |
| Observations                 | 787          | 787       | 787          | 787      | 787      |
| R-Squared                    | 0.006        | 0.032     | 0.003        | 0.006    | 0.013    |

**Table 12.** Hypotheses 6 and 7: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Family Social

 Capital on Job Satisfaction

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Table C.2 in Appendix C analyzes the effect of social capital variables on job satisfaction for attorneys in private firms only and finds similar results.

#### Discussion

In summary, the quantitative findings found partial support for most of the seven hypotheses deduced from theory on race, social capital, and attorneys. There is evidence that social capital increases salary in attorneys as previously hypothesized, but no evidence that client acquisition helps to explain that relationship. Eating meals with partners is the professional social capital network variable that emerged as an overall significant determinant of lawyer success. This turned out to be true amongst private firm attorneys only. Also, social capital affects both races equally, yet blacks and whites have different levels of social capital, which contribute to the differing levels of salary and job satisfaction.

The evidence shows some support for hypothesis 1-B. The more time that attorneys spent with low status corporate clientele, the more their salary decreased. Non-profit companies have a relatively low level of power and economic status compared to individuals and Fortune 500 companies. Although the effects of non-profit companies were marginal, analysis of multiply imputed datasets with a larger sample show that Fortune 500 companies are significantly positively related to salary. This implies that the status and type of client acquired is significant in determining client salary. Client acquisition did not mediate the relationship between social capital and salary in a lack of support of hypothesis 1-C. Future research should examine the mechanisms that connect social capital to the kind of clients that attorneys are assigned to in large firms.

The results show that there is a direct positive relationship between social capital and salary, and emphasize the significance of status range in professional social capital networks. In private firms, eating a meal with a partner, one indicator of having a social network that connects you to high status individuals in your occupation, is directly related to a higher salary. The

findings also indicate the ability of social ties to benefit individuals even after controlling for personal status and prestige. This indicates an independent effect of an individual's personal status on salary existing simultaneously with the effect of an individual's social capital on salary. Some have argued that the use of social contacts is an endogenous outcome of discrimination, and differences in the labor market (Mouw 2002). My research provides some evidence that even after controlling for the labor market, and personal status, social contacts are still significant indicators of salary amongst private firm attorneys (I realize that it does not control for discrimination). Both phenomena appear to be operating independently of one another.

For non-professional social capital, the evidence was less convincing. According to hypothesis 1-A, professional and non-professional social capital would increase client recruitment. Results show that non-professional social capital variables of using non-lawyer colleagues and informal networks to establish connections do not increase the number of clients recruited or the amount of revenue from clients. Supplementary analyses reveal that involvement in voluntary organizations does positively predict higher client acquisition, but these effects did not persist after adding controls.<sup>16</sup> This is one way in which non-professional social capital contributes to client acquisition. More involvement in voluntary organizations allows attorneys to acquire more clients due to their ability to expose individuals to weak contacts.

The effect of client acquisition on salary is less clear in these data. I find no positive effect. Other research on law firms has shown a positive effect of client acquisition on salary (Leahey and Hunter 2012), but this particular survey did not show a positive effect at the early career stage of the cohort. This is likely due to the high range of firm size. In large firms, most attorneys are not required to bring in clients; also, the clients that attorneys do bring in are more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> This table is shown in Appendix table C.3.

likely to be large companies. In smaller firms, on the other hand, the number of clients tend be higher than in large firms because the clientele are more likely to consist of individuals not companies. Future research must ask more specific questions about non-professional social capital networks such as the socioeconomic status of the individuals with whom they associate outside of their office as well as the specific type of voluntary associations they are involved in, to get a better assessment of its effect on clientele attainment.

The social capital variables appear to work equally for blacks and whites; none of the social capital interactions show a higher or lower level effect on salary for one race. This implies that the social capital effect is the same for black and white lawyers. This finding shows a lack of support for hypothesis 2 (A or B) that blacks who use social capital will experience greater or lesser effects than whites who use social capital. Although there is no racial difference in the effect of social capital on salary there do appear to be racial differences in the amount of social capital between blacks and whites. Black attorneys have lower levels of the significant social capital variables than whites. For example, among all attorneys, blacks are significantly less likely than whites to eat meals with partners. Having a meal with a partner has been shown to be a significant predictor of a higher salary for private firm attorneys.

The results of this study provide some support for Wilkins and Gulati's (1996) argument that blacks in corporate firms receive less mentoring. In their survey, only twenty-four percent of Harvard Law pre-1986 graduates reported that a senior partner had taken interest in their work and seventy-nine percent of those who said that they did not find a mentor explained it to be a significant determinant in them leaving the firm. This study adds to the previous finding by showing that this lack of association with partners also leads to a decreased income. Wilkins and Gulati explain that one of the main reasons for this discrepancy is that mentors tend to adopt protégés who "remind them of themselves." In accordance with the homophily principle, individuals prefer to associate with those with whom they feel like they have more in common. I have evidence that associating with high status individuals on the job can increase salary. Future research should assess the likely interaction between the two phenomena. Implications of the research could help design, on-the-job mentoring programs that focus on finding similarities between associates and partners rather than blindly pairing them together. They describe the similarities that create the racial discrepancy of within firm mentorship to primarily consist of racial and sexual differences. I argue that there are other possible attributes beyond race and sex that can be accented and lead to an increase in mentoring relationships between blacks and whites. Other possibilities include leisure and hobby similarities such as shared interests in sports and music. Mentoring programs should consider highlighting these social attributes in an attempt to connect mentors and protégés in addition to work interests.

The data provide evidence that the economic disparities between black and white lawyers are primarily represented by the underrepresentation of blacks in the private sector. The results contradicted hypothesis because it showed that some social capital variables contributed to the probability of being in the private sector. For example, those who used their alumni networks to find their current job were more likely to work in the private sector, whereas those who used their professor and those who used their classmates to help find their job were less likely to work in the private sector. Blacks who used their friends were marginally significant in increasing the likelihood of working in the private sector. The non-significance of the interactions simply implies that blacks and whites benefit equally from these social capital variables. Because alumni networks do increase the probability of working in the public sector, blacks who use their alumni networks can theoretically increase their probability of working in the public sector. Although using an informal mentor for networking was only a significant determinant of salary before adding controls, it is still important to note that whites were significantly higher than blacks in this variable in all firms and private firms only.

Cursory evidence supported hypothesis 5 that social capital affected job satisfaction. Those who desired more mentoring were less satisfied on their job. The results in the private firm sample reveal that blacks are significantly less satisfied with their jobs compared to whites. Overall this study shows that being connected to high status individuals in a professional network does increase salary in private firm attorneys, and provides evidence that blacks have lower levels of some types of social capital than whites. Future research should focus on the range of professional capital within occupations to learn more about its effect on income and satisfaction as well as ways to increase the lack of professional social capital in blacks.

# CHAPTER 3: QUALITATIVE DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS

The purpose of the qualitative section of this research project is to help strengthen the scholarly understanding of the mechanisms through which social capital leads to job success. To accomplish this goal, I gathered data via interviews with attorneys in both large and small corporate firms.

|          |         |       |        | Year     |                    |           |               |
|----------|---------|-------|--------|----------|--------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Intervi- |         |       |        | Admitted | Law School         | Current   |               |
| ew ID    | Name    | Race  | Sex    | to Bar   | Attended           | Location  | Firm Type     |
|          |         |       |        |          | The University of  |           |               |
|          |         |       |        |          | Illinois at Urbana |           |               |
| 1        | James   | Black | Male   | 2008     | Champaign          | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | DePaul             |           |               |
| 2        | Tracy   | Black | Female | 2009     | University         | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | The University of  |           | -             |
|          |         |       |        |          | Illinois at Urbana |           |               |
| 3        | Patrice | Black | Female | 2009     | Champaign          | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | Howard             |           | c             |
| 4        | Erin    | Black | Female | 2008     | University         | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | The University of  |           | c             |
| 5        | Amy     | White | Female | 2006     | Iowa               | Iowa City | Small Private |
|          | 2       |       |        |          | The University of  | 2         |               |
| 6        | Michael | Black | Male   | 2006     | Iowa               | Iowa City | Small Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | Harvard            | 2         |               |
| 7        | Paul    | Black | Male   | 1994     | University         | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | The University of  | C         | C             |
| 8        | Keith   | Black | Male   | 2002     | Chicago            | Chicago   | Large Private |
|          |         |       |        |          | The University of  | e         | č             |
| 9        | Troy    | White | Male   | 1997     | Michigan           | Chicago   | Large Private |

 Table 13. Characteristics of Attorneys Interviewed

#### Sample

Between November 2011 and November 2012, I conducted 10 interviews with a diverse sample of attorneys in Chicago, IL and Iowa City, IA. Nine of the attorneys worked in the private sector (corporate) and one was a government employee. I omitted the government employee from the analysis for several reasons. First, this attorney was the only participant who did not authorize an audio recording of the interview, and therefore the data from this interview is much less rich than the data from the others. Second, this participant's answers were often tangential and he was evasive when answering some significant questions. For example, he did not want to speak about his level of job satisfaction because he feared potential ramifications at his job as a government employee. Overall, I concluded that this participant was probably not a fair representation of a government attorney and did not have the trust in the research needed to provide complete and honest answers. Table 1 presents basic information for each of the remaining nine attorneys and includes assigned pseudonyms. The final sample included two white and seven black interviewees, and the gender breakdown was four women and five men. Two attorneys had 10 or more years of experience while the other 7 had fewer than 10 years of experience. Troy stopped working as an attorney after approximately five years at a large firm and four years at a health care company (he moved on to the finance department within the second company). His interview focused primarily on his experience in the large firm, which only lasted for 5 years, so although he passed the bar in 1997 he is still classified as an inexperienced attorney. In addition, Tracy's large corporate firm experience took place in Indianapolis, Indiana about one year prior to the interview.

Two of the attorneys were interviewed in Iowa. This was a dual interview including a black male and a white female attorney who preferred to be interviewed at the same time due to

time constraints. The attorneys in this dual interview were both employed at small firms (although one was at a significantly larger firm than the other), whereas all corporate attorneys interviewed in Chicago worked in firms with more than 100 attorneys. The white female worked at a firm with 11 attorney employees (8 partners and 3 associates) while the black male worked in a 2-person firm. Both attorneys expressed that an 11-person firm was extremely large for this particular market in Iowa. The overall sample varied with respect to the prestige of the law school attended; two attorneys graduated from extremely prestigious law schools: Harvard University and the University of Chicago. I compared the sample on three characteristics: race, experience, and firm size. The primary racial comparison is between the two individuals in small firms.

Overall, the diverse sample strengthens the internal validity of the study and provides descriptions and understanding from a variety of perspectives. The experienced attorneys have ideas and insights because of the amount of time they have spent in their occupation. Each of the experienced attorneys have been around their field for at least 10 years and therefore have had time to examine what really works and what does not work with regard to attaining success at the firm. However, experienced attorneys are more likely to be biased and somewhat rigid in their ways of thinking based on their specific experiences or because they have befriended a specific group of people in the firm. The data from inexperienced attorneys are beneficial because the insights of these interviewees are based on a fresh perspective that is less tainted by the law firm and more focused on the struggles of those establishing themselves early in their career. These respondents are less susceptible to internal bias and being stuck in ingrained habits, and more likely to see the particular constraints that early career attorneys face. Having both types of

attorneys allows for an understanding of the needs at both levels as well as provides a check on the possible biases and inaccuracies of either position.

Having attorneys at different-size firms is also extremely beneficial because the needs and concerns of these two different types of firms are likely to be quite different. The structure of a firm with hundreds of people in a large city such as Chicago is fundamentally distinct from the structure of a firm employing 10 attorneys in a small city in Iowa. The larger firm must bring in more money because of their location as well as the number of salaries they need to pay; this factor alone can lead to differences in what it takes to be successful in each type of firm. Interviewing attorneys in both types of firms allows for a deeper understanding of what it takes to be successful in both types of firms, and provides a comparison between the mechanisms that operate within the two structures, which is beneficial for a nuanced analysis of the field.

Finally, the racial diversity in the study sheds light on the perspectives of both black and white attorneys. Members of these two racial groups have different expectations placed upon them concerning their competence and preferences, and have divergent historical experiences; these and other differences may lead to disparate abilities to attain social capital and success within a job. A side-by-side comparison between the two racial groups allows me to examine if any of these differences affect the experiences and success of attorneys. One caveat is that the white sample is small relative to the black sample; therefore these groups are not perfectly comparable and the results for whites need to be treated with more caution. Diversity in experience, firm size, and race strengthens the internal validity and the scope of the study because this diversity allows me to obtain a more thorough understanding of multiple perspectives and to compare these perspectives.

To recruit participants, I gained access to corporate firms through contacts within my own social networks. I emailed personal contacts, asking if they knew any attorneys in corporate firms who would be willing to participate in an interview with me. I had my original contacts forward potential participants a recruitment letter requesting their participation in the study. My contacts either told me that I could contact the potential participants or had the participants respond directly to me. Upon receipt of the response, I determined a time and place to conduct the interview. Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes to one hour. The questions assessed the role that respondents' social capital has played in their success. The questions were written to allow for and seek alternative explanations (aside from social capital) for career paths and success.<sup>17</sup> I recorded the data with a tape-recorder and then transcribed the interviews. Questions focused on social networks and daily work experience. I also used some of the questions from the AJD to get a better description of why a respondent may have answered that way on the survey; these results are analyzed in the final chapter of the dissertation.

#### **Analysis Plan**

I utilized a constant comparative method approach to analyze the interviews (Glaser and Strauss 1967). After collecting the data I transcribed it, then read over it searching for general categories that emerged. I compared the categories in a constant comparative analysis. I first used open coding to organize the interview responses by their content and emotions. Then I examined the coded phrases and categorized them into themes that emerged in the process of axial coding. For example, if the sample described several instances of mentorship as a significant component of success, I began coding for all words and phrases associated with mentoring. The goal of this method of analysis was to develop and test a theory of how social

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Appendix D for questionnaire.

capital affects job success for lawyers. The simultaneous comparison facilitates theory generation and hypothesis testing.

To increase the validity of my findings I used member checking, triangulation, peer debriefing, and a search for disconfirming evidence.<sup>18</sup> To member check the data. I submitted the themes to the participants after coding for them. I also submitted the raw data to a sociology professor at a large university to conduct peer debriefing. The professor examined the data, and then checked my themes to determine whether she agreed with them and whether I had missed any other emergent themes. To establish triangulation I collected data from a variety of types of attorneys in a variety of settings at several different times. I researched the organizations that participants mentioned as significant to them in an online search to double check their relevance. The sample included experienced and non-experienced attorneys; small and large firm attorneys, and black and white attorneys. This variety in the sample contributed to my confidence in the validity of the themes that persisted across interviews. Increasing the range of characteristics in the sample allowed me to gain a broader perspective on what it takes to be successful as an attorney in a firm (Creswell and Miller 2000). Overarching themes emerged with regard to all attorneys interviewed and the specified categories of attorneys. I discuss these themes in depth in the next section.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> One of my personal experiences may have biased my interpretations of the data, so I believe it is important to disclose my own organizational membership. Some of the evidence in favor of social capital describes Black Greek Letter Fraternities as bridging and bonding organizations that increase social capital. I am a member of a Black Greek Letter Fraternity and thus may be biased concerning the overall effectiveness and benefits of these organizations. This potential bias may have influenced my interpretations and analysis of the themes that emerged. One of the attorneys in the sample was contacted through fraternity associations. This connection has two implications: Support for the bridging capabilities of an organization such as a fraternity and the possibility of biased interpretations of the effects of fraternities in this analysis.

#### Results

After interviewing nine corporate attorneys, several themes about the work environment and what it takes to be successful emerged across the three categories of attorneys. The first two themes emerged in the comparison between attorneys in small firms and attorneys in large firms. First, for those in large firms, relationships with partners were an essential factor in gaining access to billable hours of work. Second, in smaller firms the ability to recruit clients was a necessary skill in maintaining work and pay. In addition, for those in smaller firms, social networks emerged as a significant factor in acquiring clients.<sup>19</sup> For example, the white attorney in the small firm had a higher status range in her social network than the black attorney in the small firm. The third emergent theme concerns the determinants of longevity and the direct link between experience and salary for attorneys in large firms. The salary of an attorney at a large firm is fixed by the length of time at the firm (this does not include bonuses). If the attorney does not meet the standards of the firm, they are asked to leave before reaching higher salary levels. Therefore, experienced attorneys at large firms have met a high standard for producing billable hours and fitting the mold of the firm in order to stay employed. The experienced attorneys I interviewed possessed three characteristics that allowed them to stay at their respective firms and become partners: they had established positive relationships with partners in their firm; they were highly competent; and they seemed to genuinely enjoy their work. Some of the inexperienced attorneys in the sample who did not possess these characteristics had already left their respective firms.

The fourth theme—the significance of a relationship with an unofficial mentor, sometimes outside the firm—was overarching and emerged among all types of attorneys. Although the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>I tried to do an analysis of the effect of client acquisition on salary just for those in small firms with the AJD survey data but the N was too small (Under 40).

attorneys may have had officially assigned mentors, each attorney in the sample also had unofficial mentors who offered advice. The status and helpfulness of these unofficial mentors were particularly significant. Some of the black attorneys had difficulty establishing positive relationships with the partners because they did not feel as socially and culturally connected to them. The final emergent overarching theme is that bridging and bonding organizations were significant determinants of weak and strong ties respectively. These organizations established connections that created resources that led to the acquisition of clients; the organizations also established close connections and support for the attorneys. Each of these four themes provides insights into the significance of social capital for the success of an attorney in a large or small corporate firm.

## Large-Firm, Little-Experience Attorneys: Connecting with Partners

The sample included five attorneys in the "large firm, little experience" category, and two attorneys in the "small firm, little experience" category. The theme that developed in the large firm, little experience group was the significance of attaining "billable hours" from partners. Billable hours include any work that the firm can charge to a specific client and that is directly related to a specific case. Associates obtain billable hours by being assigned to the cases of clients that the partners provide. A relationship with a partner is an important prerequisite to associates obtaining these billable hours because the partner must know who the associate is and trust that he or she can do the work competently. Large firms set a quota for the number of billable hours that are necessary for their associates to continue working at the firm. In addition, bonuses are based on the number of billable hours an associate has received. Patrice provided evidence of the significance of billable hours when she explained:

You want to be making your hours every year. We have an hours policy where there is a certain amount of billable hours that you have to reach per year. So you need to be

meeting those hours and whatever you're doing in those hours you need to be doing it well. And you need to be doing firm committees and activities so you're showing that you're vested in the firm. Networking with people here in the firm. Basically putting that face time in. Also, you have to be writing articles. We're very big on pro bono here so you need to be doing pro bono. Business development, whenever you can, you need to be out talking to people so hopefully one day someone will need something and you'll be able to bring that business in and bring clients into the firm.

In Patrice's description of the three most important ways to be successful in the firm, making billable hours is clearly the most important method. James provided further evidence of the significance of billable hours and specifically described affiliation with partners as a way of obtaining hours. According to James, it is important for associates to gain a rapport with partners so partners will feel comfortable giving associates billable hours. He explained that having a relationship with a partner creates an advantage for that associate over someone who does not have a relationship with the partner. He said:

Anytime that you can have to interact with the partners influences your relationship and workload, which is especially beneficial in firms because you need to bill a certain amount of hours per year. If the partner develops a rapport and can trust an associate they will give them more work. It can create an advantage. Someone who is not in that network can still be successful but they have to work hard and be a little bit better than the person who has that social advantage. Because as a new attorney, the clients come from the partners in the firm who give you work, so that's how you start with that networking.

When asked about the climate between peers in her office, Erin noted that overall it was congenial, yet there was still competition in getting billable hours from the "right" partners. She explained, "...But I also do think it's pretty competitive as far as billing your hours and getting the right work and impressing the right partners." Erin specifically discussed creating a relationship with the "right" partners, which implies that it is more beneficial to have good rapport with some partners than with others. Below I provide further evidence that connecting with higher status partners is more beneficial than connecting with lower status partners. This

finding reveals the significance of obtaining a high status range in professional social capital networks.

Erin made the analogy that associates approach partners like "salesmen" going door-todoor trying to get work. Partners need to trust that an associate will do good work for them. In order for partners to establish those trust relationships, they need to feel comfortable with associates. Sometimes this occurs through social interactions outside the office. There are many firm-sponsored outings and social events that associates can attend to get to know other associates and partners. In addition to events sponsored by the firm, there are informal social activities, such as going to bars, going hunting, or eating out, in which partners and associates participate, and these can contribute to a stronger relationship with the partners. Some associates do not feel comfortable attending these formal or informal events. These associates are likely to attend the formal events because there is more pressure to do so in order to appear grouporiented at the firm. Some associates either do not get invited to many informal events or just choose not to attend, mainly because they do not have as much in common with the partners as other associates do. This dynamic affects the relationship between associates and partners and can affect the amount and type of billable hours associates receive. Erin described this dynamic when she was asked how to get billable hours:

The most likely way is if things are slow, you almost go door-to-door like a salesman and ask people if they need help. Tell them that you're interested in what they're working on. Or you're interested in working with them or for their particular client and try to sell yourself in hopes that when they have a need for somebody that's on your level they'll go to you. A lot of times, unfortunately, partners will go to people that they've used before. So if they haven't used you before it might not be likely that they use you. Or they might go for people who look like them, went to their same school. Whose dad plays golf with them or goes to church with them, which could be difficult in my situation. If I don't have that connection or that similarity.

In this quote, Erin revealed the significance of having a non-professional social network of significant size and range when she explained that partners may be more likely to give work to people who attended their alma mater, or "whose dad plays golf with them or goes to church with them." An individual with a high level of status in their networks is more likely to be connected to a partner at a law firm. Erin also noted that partners may feel closer to people who "look like them."

Tracy experienced some hardships building positive relationships with partners. She did not feel like she fit in well with the partners at all, and blamed this on her racial and personal differences. This feeling greatly contributed to her dissatisfaction with her job and ultimately her decision to leave the firm. When asked to describe her relationship with her mentor, Tracy said:

I was assigned a mentor when I first got there [as an intern]. She was a young black female who was a member of my sorority. When I was assigned to be an associate she wasn't my formal mentor but she continued to mentor me. My formal mentor was a 40year old white woman partner. She was assigned to me. She started out okay even though I was warned against her because they had not been able to keep a woman of color for years. It's almost the kiss of death. And actually that's what happened to me. The way that she operated was to make herself look great to the people that were watching when really, she wasn't very good. She was helpful in some aspects. But in others she would try to knock you down instead of build you up.

### [Interviewer] How so?

She had her favorites and it was very obvious who her favorites were; a senior associate who worked next door to me. Then she brought another associate in.

It started out that she was working directly with me, and then all of a sudden I wasn't working directly with her anymore. Which I found interesting because you're my mentor and you've only raved about my work, at least to my face. Eventually it got to the point where she would assign me work but only through her senior associate who was her right-hand man. I didn't realize then, until I had some time to reflect. I know that I was doing good work, then all of a sudden it felt like I wasn't doing very good work.

*[Interviewer] Why did your mentor choose those [associates] to be her favorites?* I have few different ideas about that. It's easier to connect with people that are like you. And I saw that come up time and time again in the law firm.... Jesse's favorites were very much like her. They were younger white women attorneys, married, one of them had two kids and they were always talking about their kids and their family.

Tracy's first formal mentor eventually became her informal mentor. The two had a positive relationship and shared many characteristics, from gender race to sorority affiliation. These similarities and relationships allowed for their mentor relationship to continue beyond the formal level. Tracy's negative relationship with her next formal mentor contributed directly to her lack of getting work. She felt that she was out of favor with her formal mentor, and that this was directly correlated with being assigned less work. Tracy's quote contains further evidence of the significance of participation in formal and informal events with partners. Tracy described how those who develop these relationships with partners get into the "club," which increases their chances of getting more work and better feedback from the partners. She also highlighted how partners who have more common interests and share certain characteristics with associates are more likely to favor them. As she described, the associates whom the partners like were likely to be asked to an informal activity such as getting drinks. Tracy considered associates who had this level of rapport with a partner to be in the "club." The perks of being in the "club" include getting more billable hours.

Each of the black large firm, little experience attorneys described, in their own way, having positive relationships with partners as the most important component to being successful in a large law firm. Troy, the white large firm, little experience attorney, was a special case because his interview occurred 12 years after he left the firm and thus his answers were based on memories. As a result, his experience and Tracy's may not be directly comparable. Troy did not name gaining billable hours through relationships with partners as the most significant factor to becoming successful; however, this concept was implicit in his explanation of what was most important. Troy believed that the best way to become successful in a large corporate firm setting was to change one's mindset and put work before everything else in life. When asked what it takes to be successful, Troy stated:

It was the standard lockstep world where salaries were going through the roof. So you had to just be good at your job and deliver against what the expectations were while figuring out how to move along in the environment and if you were able to do that then you kept moving up.

You had to have a mindset that your life was serving clients and they were paying big money for your services so you had to be willing to give up your own personal time and independence in order to get paid the crazy amount of money that young associates get paid for not really knowing anything. Yet being willing to undertake that with the mindset that you were getting overpaid relative to your value proposition because of the way the pyramid worked and the billing environment.

Troy emphasizes that you had to be willing to "give up your independence" and work within the "pyramid" and the billing environment." Thus while he doesn't directly emphasize the importance of getting access to billable hours, he does emphasize how the structure of the law firm means that young associate attorneys were working on projects with senior people before they really "[knew] anything." I believe this was his view for one main reason: Troy developed a mentor relationship with a partner in his field who had been giving him 65 percent of his entire working hours at the firm, and therefore finding billable hours was never a major problem for him. Troy explained: "I worked probably 65 percent of time with one tax partner. That's probably where I got most of my work and then the rest of my time was probably split up pretty evenly between 4 other partners." When I asked Troy if this was the partner who he had earlier described as a mentor, he replied, "Yes. When you're [working] that many hours and that often for somebody you get lots of insights from him." I then asked whether the relationship developed formally or informally, and Troy answered "Informally, through the work we did." Overall, the answers given by these large firm little experience attorneys demonstrate the importance of

gathering billable hours through positive relationships with partners, and therefore the problems that emerge for young attorneys if their relationship with a partner is not positive.

## Small-Firm, Little-Experience Attorneys: Attaining Clients

In contrast to attorneys with little experience working in large firms, the small firm, little experience attorneys placed emphasis not on getting billable hours from partners, but rather creating billable hours by producing and maintaining clientele. Amy described how her firm hired her with the belief that she could produce business for the firm. She did not feel day-to-day pressure from the partners to bring in clients, but did explain that if a significant amount of time had gone by without any new work from clients she would get reprimanded. When asked what characteristics it took to be successful she said:

I think part of it is just the length of time you've been practicing. I mean the longer you practice, the better you get at things, the better your name is out there, the more people think that you have that expertise and the acumen in whatever that particular area is. Because of that I think that you can also charge higher [rates].

With respect to rates, I noticed a distinct difference between small firm, little experience attorneys and large firm, little experience attorneys. Small firm, little experience attorneys set their own hourly rates based on the specific client and case, whereas large firm, little experience attorneys did not.<sup>20</sup> Amy explained each of the components of success in a way that emphasized increasing the client base at her small firm. For example, she specifically explained that having more experience allows attorneys to get better at their job, which in turn allows them to provide better service and thus charge a higher rate to clients as well be exposed to other prospective clients. As he sat side-by-side with her in the coffee shop, Michael echoed Amy's response; he described a similar experience of the feeling the necessity of acquiring clients:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> I confirmed that attorneys at large firms do not set their own rates in my interview with Paul, one of the senior partners at a large law firm; he said that the finance department determined their rates.

It comes with a contribution to the firm. You know, rainmaker? Are you bringing in folks? You have more value. You have more expertise in an area whether it's tax or real estate or something else, you have a value. And so the more you work, the more productive you are, the longer you're around, the more people in your profession know you and the public knows you, you go up that ladder. So the functioning of the billing hour is a function of your skill, the market, your level of expertise and so on. So what's being paid in Des Moines, you can't charge that here. What you're going to get paid here in Iowa City, which is a small town, is more than what you're going to get paid in Washington [Iowa], which is a smaller city. So it's a function of the market. So I think she [Amy] said it all. Billing is an art. Growing in your profession is an art. I don't think there's a single one thing you can do.

Amy continued, explaining that the type of clients they gathered were extremely important to

their career success. She also noted that client acquisition is something that occurs through an

individual's personal social networks. She commented:

I think it also depends on who your clientele is. I mean the partners at my law firm who make the most money have practices who have clientele who can...afford them. The guy in my office who does criminal defense and who works with divorces and family law does not make as much as the guy who does...works with business and real estate developers. I think in Iowa City, I think part of what's difficult in Iowa City or a smaller legal market like we have here is that your clients are also often...because you get your clients through networking and volunteering and for knowing people and making those connections.

I think what can be awkward in Iowa City or smaller markets is that your clients can end up being your friends and neighbors. So I think it makes for like an awkward, I mean, for me it makes for an awkward relationship because, like, you, especially for estate planning and stuff. I mean you get, you know a lot of intimate...secrets, intimate information about people. And they can be your down-the-street neighbor, and you're like, "thanks for coming to see me, that's \$1200."

Having to acquire clients and having to acquire them through personal connections is a major distinction between large firm, little experience attorneys and small firm, little experience attorneys. Amy's feelings of awkwardness reflect the difficulties that can come from using non-professional or family social networks to develop professional clientele (i.e. converting a social relationship into a professional one requires at least temporarily shifting the definition of the relationship).

After examining the social networks of these two small firm, little experience attorneys, Amy appears to have a higher status range than Michael, which corresponded to the type of

clients they successfully recruited. For example, when Amy was asked how she obtained clients,

she reported that her father (a physician) and other family members referred some clients, strictly based on her connections to those people. In contrast, Michael's primary method was advertising

though Google and getting referral methods from other attorneys through organizations.

Although Michael's methods of client attainment allowed him to obtain some clients, Amy was able to utilize a greater variety of methods of client attainment. This difference revealed that Amy had a larger social network as well as a higher status range within her network. This ability to gather clients via more pathways may lead to obtaining more and higher status clients, and illustrates the advantages that come with having high status social origins. Amy explained that she gathered clients through her affiliations with organizations as well as through family and friend connections. When asked how she acquired clients, she responded:

I have tried to figure out what that is and people come to me personally for a number of reasons. One is that they just know who I am. They're friends of mine or neighbors' or friends of friends and they're like I need a lawyer so I'll call Amy. So that's nice, but it's not like they're coming to me because of my expertise or I'm such a great attorney. I only say that because it's a little disconcerting because it's like, it's not like they came to me because I'm super awesome or whatever, they just sort of trust me like because someone else trusted me. The second reason is I volunteer for some things. I'm involved in, not necessarily professional organizations, but I volunteer for a lot of arts organizations. So some people who know me through that will contact me or I will do some pro bono work for whatever organization and they will be like ok, "we want," or, "the next step is to do this" and I'm like, great, now I get to charge you.

And then the third thing is...I've had some random people look at our websites. And they're like, "I see you specialize in whatever." Or I helped someone with a real estate transaction and then so they're like, "Ok, I know you do real estate, or I know you do, whatever," and then they'll call. My dad's a doctor at the hospital. He had one of his residents come see me, and then one of the resident's friends came, great. But that's like so far attenuated, and then like why? Because their friends trusted my dad, ok, great.
Amy was somewhat perplexed about how little a client had to know about the attorney as long as there was a connection whom they trusted, but her explanations nonetheless reveal the significance of Amy's social capital. Individuals who knew nothing about her capabilities were willing to do business with her because of who referred them to her, illustrating both the "pipes" and "prisms" advantages of her community-based social capital. When Michael was asked the same question, he answered:

Clients' find me by Google searching, so they find the website. Perhaps it's someone that I know, the networking is important. It can be informal, someone in the church, someone who lives down the street from you. You helped John Doe. And John tells Jane and just by extension.

Or maybe they're referrals, so I helped someone, and maybe the person who's coming to me on referral is coming about something totally unrelated but [they] know that I helped "John" so, "I think you can help me too." So I thank John for that referral, but not all of them turn out to be matters you can handle for whatever reason, so there's the informal referrals you get. So you get to meet these other attorneys by various professional groups, whether it's the local bar association or some other organization is how you meet them. Maybe they're a law school classmate. From time to time I'll have a classmate who's practicing somewhere out of state and I have a client who's living in this area. Hey, they got this problem, can you help them. Or they'll come to me, "he told me to come see you, she told me to come see you. Sometimes I can help, sometimes I can't. So it's the loose associations and the formal ones.

Michael's formal organizational ties allowed him to connect with other attorneys who might refer clients to him. He explained that his informal connections were made via Google searches, church, and client referrals. He only vaguely mentioned the ability to get clients from personal networks, in much less specific terms than Amy's story about the referral from her father; Michael's more concrete examples focused on professional social capital (i.e. referrals from other attorneys). Unfortunately, neither participant reported how many clients they had obtained in the past year, so I cannot make a direct comparison. Lawyers did not report how many clients they had primarily because many were not responsible for obtaining clients, and did not acquire any. Others did not keep track of what the exact number of clients they acquired. Still, the size and status range of Amy's networks appeared to facilitate her exposure to clients and thus the expansion of her clientele. For example, her father's high status position as a physician amplified Amy's status and made the client more willing to hire her. In addition, her more numerous connections meant that her information was more widely spread to others (Podolny 1993; 2001). These non-professional network connections were influential in increasing Amy's clientele.

As explained above, client acquisition is not significant for job success for large firm, little experience attorneys, but is vital for small firm, little experience attorneys. Types of clients are important as well. Companies pay higher rates and need legal services more often. However, having corporate clients may not be realistic for an attorney's specific legal interests. Acquiring clients is heavily dependent on personal networks and referrals from clients and other attorneys. Those with a higher status range in networks will be more likely to have more, dependable clients, leading to more job success. This scenario highlights the significance of personal social networks, but only for small firm, little experience attorneys. For large firm, little experience attorneys, the most important thing is staying connected to an influential partner who has access to billable hours.

#### Experienced Large-Firm Attorneys: Keys to Longevity

With only one exception, experiences between experienced and inexperienced corporate attorneys were similar. The experienced attorneys made it through the stresses of being a junior associate and become partners in their respective firms. Three characteristics of these experienced attorneys emerged as key to their longevity in the large corporate setting: 1) their rapport with high status partners, 2) their competence, and 3) their affinity for the work in the firm. Keith is a junior partner at a large firm in Chicago with 10 years of experience. Paul rose through the ranks of partner at a large Chicago firm, then moved to the public sector for a time and has now started his own firm. Both individuals are examples of the small number of black attorneys who have chosen to and been able to remain in a large corporate firm setting through the stressors of the workload and obtaining billable hours. Their insights and characteristics personify what it has taken to become successful. Notably, these are the only two attorneys in the sample from extremely elite institutions (Keith attended the University of Chicago and Paul attended Harvard University; also, Keith came into his position already having an MBA and business experience). This is another example of how both of these attorneys are in all probability very competent.

Keith explained that promotions and salary raises are part of a natural progression of working at a large firm. Everyone is paid the same rate based on the amount of time they have worked at the firm. If they are not performing to the firm's liking, they will be asked to leave. Keith also explained that bonus pay is more subjective and is based on the number of billable hours, perceived quality of work, and client relationships. When asked how the most successful people in his firm had gotten to their positions, Keith said:

A couple of different things, and one of those is developing relationships with existing clients, bringing in new clients. Developing relationships with important partners. So that you become the person that partner transitions in to that client relationship or who they take along when they go pitch new business. So some of it is being chosen, but a lot of it comes from the first two things of working hard, and having the reputation of doing good work. There are some other things like do I like this person? Do I connect with this person? Do I think that that person is someone like me and represents the qualities we want to have from an attorney at my firm?

Keith provided confirmation of the sentiments of the inexperienced attorneys, that being connected with important partners is quite significant for success because of the partners' connections to billable hours. As an attorney becomes more experienced, that connection to

partners also becomes important as a way to gain relationships with clients. Keith also mentioned several measures of social identity such as, "Do I like this person? Do I connect with this person?" These factors determine how well an attorney can fit in with the culture of the firm. Other minority attorneys in this research have struggled to fit into this firm's culture, but Keith is an example of a black male corporate attorney who has fit into the culture with no major problems. Keith's quote highlights the significance of being connected to and building a rapport with "important" partners. This lends further support to the significance of a high status range in professional social capital networks. The quote also clearly highlights the significance of competence, because Keith explained that individuals must have the reputation of doing "good work." These two concepts appear to be necessary to maintain a position at a large firm. When asked how he felt about his ability to achieve all of the feats he had just described, Keith replied:

Pretty well. I think from my perspective I look at it I think that I'm on track. I think that there are some people who are ahead of me. Who maybe have worked more hours or have developed a slightly better perception of doing great work but I don't think there's much distinction in terms of how I'm perceived. At least I don't think that my likelihood of success is different from anyone else's.

Paul echoed these sentiments when asked what it took to be successful on the job. He responded:

I think by and large you have to have a group of people, partners really who have a significant amount of business and are willing to put you on their cases. And if you have...from an external contact perspective, if you have the ability to generate business that helps.

# [Interviewer] By ability to generate business do you mean acquire clients? Exactly.

When I asked Paul after the interview about the time demands and whether they bothered him, he explained that they were not a hindrance at all for him because he loved what he did. The entire tone of the interview with Paul implied that he had accomplished all of his success with ease and that as long as you follow the formula of being connected to the partners who generate a lot of business and you love what you do then you will be successful. Loving the job emerged as the third, yet possibly equally significant determinant of whether or not an associate at a large firm would stay or go. That love for the job helps buffer some of the stress of the demands and long hours of the job. When I asked Keith how satisfied he was on the job, he explained that he was satisfied and one reason was that he genuinely liked the work. This affinity is one of the main reasons Keith had been working at the firm for 10 years; he concluded, "I'm relatively satisfied. I like what I do I like the work, I like the flexibility and the freedom."

Some inexperienced attorneys left the job because they did not meet one of these three criteria necessary to achieve longevity. As mentioned in a previous section, Tracy was quite unhappy with her experiences at a large firm. She was not able to establish a good relationship with a partner and as a result she was very unsatisfied with her job. Tracy said that she "hated that job." Unsurprisingly, she quickly left the job and moved to the government sector. Troy, in contrast, had a great relationship with a partner; however, he still decided to leave because he did not truly enjoy the work. When asked why he left his job at a large firm, he explained that he was not passionate about his work and was interested in exploring other options:

I was more interested in being on the business side and doing what clients do than continuing at Johnson. So I got an opportunity that was low risk and I didn't have to leave Chicago to work for a great company with a really strong tax department. So I took the chance to find out if I would like that better than I liked doing what I was doing at Jameson with the general thought that if I didn't like being on the client side as well as I liked being in a law firm then someone would take me and my 2200 billable hours a year in tax right back and maybe I'd make partner a year or two later but it was a pretty low risk opportunity. I needed to find out if I was going to be happier working inside a company versus working at Johnson.

These two examples show that associates who do not enjoy the work at a large firm or who do not build a rapport with the right partner may be less likely to remain at their large corporate firm and become a partner. Having a love for the work, a good relationship with a partner, and a record of competence are extremely important in the retention of attorneys at large firms. Keith and Paul are examples of those who have met the three significant criteria of competence, relationships with partners, and love for the work, and this has allowed them to achieve longevity in their field. Social capital, then, makes up one of the essential components of success at a large firm, even for those individuals with high levels of skill and interest in the work.

#### **Unofficial Mentors**

Attorneys across contexts described receiving guidance from unofficial mentors as a must. For some, unofficial mentors were useful in answering relevant questions and providing advice about career movement as well as specific legal questions. The large firm, little experience attorneys noted that their firms had formal mentoring programs in which associates were assigned an official mentor with whom to spend one to three hours a month. They all described having an assigned mentor and reported that those relationships typically did not work out, but that a "natural" mentoring relationship had developed with another attorney. Patrice spoke very highly of her unofficial mentors, and explained how they helped her with the intangibles of her career including networking. When I asked what was the most instrumental factor in establishing her network connections, Patrice said:

There are people that guide me and say you should do X and you should do Y. I have Jeff who is a partner at Sampson. [He] has been a tremendous inspiration and mentor to me and he has also made it so I've had opportunities to network with people and to do things that I probably would not have had the opportunity to do on my own.

Also, I have another mentor who is at K&J, Pat, who has been instrumental and I met her before I met Sheena back in '07 and she was my partner mentor at another firm here in Chicago and she was amazing, so I'm not from Chicago so I latched on to her. And she has a connection and a network of people because she's a partner. She's been in this game way longer than me and has introduced me to a number of people. She's allowed me to have opportunities.

They have been really amazing and I don't know what I would have done without them. I also have a mentor here that kinda helped me when I initially started, umm, Bert, who has been amazing. I had my first trial with him. I didn't get to do anything, it was a pro bono case and it was just wonderful being able to watch him in action and learn from the entire process. So those have been the three people who have helped me get established and foster networking opportunities in different situations.

Patrice described how significant these unofficial mentors have been in her life. They helped her gain experience on the job through being able to work on a case with them. She also stated that having an experienced partner as a mentor was important because of the partner's ability to introduce them to other people. When I asked James, another interviewee, whom he asked for advice, he described two senior associates. One was a senior associate in his own department with whom he worked closely. The other was a senior associate who worked in another department. The senior associate from the outside department shared an organizational affiliation with James-they had been in the same fraternity. James considered him a mentor. He described how comfortable he felt going to this particular individual: "I could go to him with more general problems or advice. If I was seeking advice on career issues or issues within the firm; and he was a very nice guy, very helpful guy." As James explained, these unofficial mentor relationships were extremely helpful for him. He developed one of these unofficial mentor relationships through his positive relationship with his co-workers. He developed his other unofficial mentor relationship through his affiliation with his fraternity, which includes individuals with a range of socioeconomic statuses.

These unofficial mentor relationships are extremely important for large firm, little experience attorneys because individuals are not able to go to their official mentor for all of their needs, either because the time that associates have with these mentors is limited or because they do not feel totally comfortable asking them certain questions. James provided evidence of this in his interview when he explained that young associates do not go to partners as often as they may need to, because of pressure to appear skilled and capable. "Young attorneys tend to, uh, sometimes be cautious in going to partners because you don't want to seem like you're not competent." Patrice also described sometimes being cautious in going to partners; when asked whom she went to for advice she replied:

It depends; if I'm on a case and it's just me and the partner and I have a question that I feel like is way below his pay grade (laughs) I will try to find someone else to ask. But if it's something very important and integral to the case I feel comfortable asking the partner. If I make a mistake or am concerned about something I definitely always try to find someone like an associate to ask first how can I fix it.

Elise also described establishing relationships with unofficial mentors through her social

networks. When asked how the relationship with her informal mentor began, she answered:

They actually kind of just fell. Those people took an interest in me, I don't think I necessarily sought them out. One was at an event where the informal mentor met my dad and they both went to undergrad at the same time. They didn't know each other but they both went to the same school. And from then on he invited me to lunch and I invited him to lunch to pick his brain and to get advice.

Elise became connected to her mentor as a result of her father's social network, which shows the significance of having a network with a high range of status. Because he was a college graduate, Elise's father was able to connect her to this potential mentor who took a liking to her and decided to give her guidance in her career. These quotes all demonstrate the importance of finding unofficial mentors in being successful on the job. Unofficial mentors help by providing networking connections and good career advice to young associates. They also provide additional advice, because associates may be too intimidated to ask an assigned mentor certain questions. Having an unofficial mentor with high status is more beneficial than having one with low status, because high status mentors have more connections and more experience to share

with their mentees. Having larger and higher range social networks also contributes to the acquisition of these unofficial mentors.

Tracy was an interviewee who did not get along very well with her formal mentor and

therefore relied heavily on her informal mentors for advice. When asked who she went to for

advice, she said:

I went to the woman who started out as my mentor when I was a summer [intern]. Her name is Roxanne and she is a member of my sorority. The reason why I was confident in going to her was that I knew she would tell me the truth and tell me how to maneuver the situation. The very first day we went to lunch she told me the truth. She said if you're going to come here to Indianapolis from Chicago you're going to have to realize that your social life is going to be terrible. So I knew up front that I could trust her and be honest with her...Then, the last person I went to was my [official] mentor.

Even the experienced attorneys credited unofficial mentors as the people they went to for help

with career guidance as well as general advice. When asked whom he went to for advice Keith

explained:

It depends on what the problem is. If it's a problem, substantively in terms of how do we do something legally, or what's the best way to think about something. I'll talk to a couple of senior lawyers who actually might sit next door to me so...Or I'll talk to one of my firm mentors who's not assigned by the firm but someone I've developed a relationship with. I'll talk to him about [it]. I'll also talk to that same person about how to navigate the firm's hierarchy, the firm's politics.

Amy also mentioned the significance of her mentor experience and expressed that professionally

she would like more mentoring; when asked if she had a formal or informal mentor Amy said:

Yes. One of the older partners in my office serves as my mentor of sorts. It's a great working relationship that I'm lucky to have. When I first started out I probably talked to him every day, just because I had no idea what I was doing, and I was also mostly working on his projects so I wanted to make sure I was doing them correctly. Now I work with him less, because I have more skills and knowledge and more of my own clients. However, I still get his input any time I'm stuck or need help.

### [Interviewer] Would you like to see more or better mentoring?

For me personally, perhaps, definitely in the practice of law in general. It is still very much a learn-on-the-job, apprentice-type profession, so I can't imagine how someone succeeds without a mentor. I am fortunate to have the partner that I work with, but for

areas of practice beyond his expertise I've really had to find my own help.

Even if they related positive descriptions of their mentoring experiences, each of the inexperienced employees at both large and small firms agreed with Amy when asked if they would like to have had more or better mentoring. Patrice gave the following explanation as to why she felt that she needed better on-the job-mentoring:

I think there needs to be more guidance in terms of stuff like that, like briefing and prepping for trial. Like a lot of the things that I've learned, especially on my case when we went to trial I didn't know, I was a second year associate and I didn't know how to prep for a trial. So all that stuff I had to learn on the job.

Troy, the inexperienced attorney who was interviewed after his firm days, was the only interviewee who, when asked, said that they would not have liked to have seen more or better mentoring. Troy answered that he was satisfied with the level of mentoring that he received on the job. The descriptions of the other interviewees demonstrate the great significance across types of attorneys in having mentors present for career development, and illustrate that even individuals who have had influential mentors often believe that more mentoring would be useful because of the learn-on-the-job structure of law practices.

#### Bridging Organizations

The final theme that emerged from the interviews with these attorneys was the significance of organizational involvement. Each attorney was involved in several organizations; their descriptions of how they used these organizations showed that bridging organizations were more likely to create weak ties used for networking while bonding organizations were more likely to create strong ties used for establishing emotional support. The respondents also participated in organizations that are both bridging and bonding—both of these dynamics were enacted through their involvement with those organizations. As Tracy described, her involvement in the local bar association was mainly on a superficial level. She made connections

and published an article, but was not heavily involved in the organization. This association is a bridging organization because it involves all types of attorneys who are involved in different practices and have different racial backgrounds as well as ideologies. When I asked Tracy to describe her involvement in organizations, she responded:

With the bar associations I just went to an event now and then. I wasn't really interested in them and with the bar you have to go and you have to be involved otherwise people won't know you so I didn't give anything, and I didn't get anything aside from substantive research stuff. They put out publications and I published in one of their journals as well.

Michael also spoke of his involvement in the Inns of Court as a bridging organization that has been significant in networking with other attorneys. This organization allowed Michael to meet other attorneys, exchange ideas, and find solutions to unresolved problems. When asked whom he went to for advice, Michael replied:

I'll email attorneys who are in the Inn of Court. The Inn of [Court] meeting is once every month and there's all kinds of stories told in various areas of the law. There are presentations being made. And sometimes if you go to those presentations you might remember who gave those presentations, and you get an issue that comes up. Hmm...maybe that's a person you call and say, what do you say. So recently I had a question. An issue came up and I emailed one of the members of the Inn who I know practices in this area, just to say, "have you seen this issue?" Guardians fighting or...the cooperation of an elderly person needs to be taken care of. There's a guardian appointed by the court to help them. Okay, well there's a fight between the guardian and some other people. Have you seen this issue? How have you dealt with it? So I'll send those emails out. I do some family law, simple divorces. So I'll email someone I know that does a lot of divorces, someone in real estate. Another way [comes from] LISTSERVs that are shared.

This response provides an example of how Michael used a bridging organization to make

professional contacts and gather information. Amy also described using LISTSERVs from the Iowa Bar Associations to get information. Finally, Paul briefly described using his multiple board memberships. Paul sits on the board of directors for three organizations: his children's school, a local hospital, and an all-male African American Catholic School. When asked about the best way to meet people and acquire clients, he responded, "I would say it's a wide range of things whether it be the boards I sit on to events around the city." Paul does not give these organizations sole credit, but it is significant that as an experienced attorney in a large firm, he acknowledges that they play a role in client acquisition.

#### **Bonding Organizations**

In addition to discussing her involvement in the bar association, Tracy also described her involvement in a bonding organization. This organization was philanthropic in nature; she described herself as emotionally invested in it and it appeared to help her develop stronger relationships with other members. Although the organization was racially diverse, it was bonding because of the common ideology of philanthropy among members. Tracy described her involvement in the group in the following way:

For the philanthropic organization [Women Everywhere] run by young professionals I actually enjoyed that group. I worked on their grants committees, went to events, got to know people. I enjoyed being around them even though I was only one of three black people in an organization of 125 members. A lot them were teachers or non-profit workers and the others were lawyers, engineers, architects, accountants, all of those kinds of professions.

Tracy also described how effective another bonding organization was in establishing her

network connections. This organization bonded its members on racial lines and career lines,

bringing them closer and allowing them to be attentive to one another's needs. Tracy reported:

... The black women lawyers association because these are partners, solo practitioners, judges, professors, new attorneys. Everybody in that organization has the same mission, which is to help create opportunities for attorneys of color, especially for black women. And they're extremely helpful.

Patrice also discussed feeling a personal connection to those in her bonding organizations. She felt bonded and invested in her alumni association because of her positive experiences at law school. She said that in her group, Women Everywhere, she felt a personal connection with other members and was dedicated to helping. She was also dedicated to the mission of the Just the Beginning Foundation, which makes it more of a bonding organization. The women's forum that she described specifically has both bridging and bonding features because it united its members as women, but also involved a diverse group of women. Patrice said she would not have interacted with these women outside this group. I asked her how these organizations have helped her and she replied:

Each one serves a different purpose...For the Women Everywhere....That's very personal because someone introduced me to the law a while ago, I don't have any family members who are lawyers. There was someone in my past that introduced me to the legal field (who was a teacher) and that's what sparked my interest. I want to be able to light that fire in these girls....

For the Just the Beginning Foundation, the mission is very important, to diversify the bench. So that's why I participate in that organization. That one I've had the opportunity to network and talk to judges and lawyers from all over in a large number of practice areas.

We have a women's forum here and they do a lot of events, so again I get to meet a lot of partners and associates from other groups who, on a day-to-day basis, I wouldn't interact with.

Keith also provided details about his alumni association, which was a bonding

organization. When asked to list his voluntary organizations, he listed key leadership positions in six organizations; three of those six were affiliated with one of his alma maters. Keith serves on the advisory panel and the investment committee for the business school at his alma mater as well as the advisory board for their consulting and investment team. He acts as a liaison between his law school and the diversity law student associations (Black Law Student Association, Latino Law Student Associations). When asked which organizations he felt most connected with he said, "Probably the most connected would be the one with my law school and then the one with my undergraduate school. Those are the ones I feel most connected with." Keith's response is further evidence that individuals feel connected to their home institutions and make a strong

commitment to stay active in them. Alumni organizations most likely have several bridging features as well, but I discuss them here due to the level of closeness that individuals feel to these organizations.

Elise stated that her involvement in bonding organizations provided closer bonds to the other members in the organizations while involvement in bridging organizations helped with her with networking and connections. She noted that the "legal organizations" with which she was involved (including her firm) increased her networking connections. These organizations have more of a bridging nature and thus are more likely to create weak ties that are beneficial in networking. Elise also mentioned a minority legal organization, which had both bridging and bonding features and therefore was more likely to provide weak and strong ties. When asked about the organizations in which she was involved, she said:

Well, a lot of those organizations are minority attorneys who I feel share some of the same challenges or obstacles or even personal aspirations [and] experiences, so I do feel close to a lot of those people. So much so that I would probably hang out with them outside of work. Or have conversations with them that are unrelated to the board that we're on or being a lawyer. So I would say that I'm pretty sure that there's at least two that I could pick out from each organization that I would feel close enough to that I would call or have their personal information and contact them outside of our meetings."

# [Interviewer] Who or what was the most influential factor in establishing network connections?

I think the legal organizations, especially the minority legal organizations were the largest factor in establishing my network connections. I also think people at my firm do a pretty good job of introducing you to new people who may not look like you or who may not be in your general area of expertise, but still they see something in you or they might see something in common that might help.

James also gave credit to a bridging and bonding organization, the black law students association,

for helping him establish his network connections. He reported that the "black law students

association was really instrumental in introducing me to other lawyers in my field. This is

especially true of minority associations." This organization was bridging and bonding for him

because it allowed people with shared physical characteristics to come together and to create weak ties through networking. Overall, bonding organizations such as mentoring and philanthropic organizations encouraged stronger ties among these lawyers.

#### Discussion

After conducting these interviews and examining the common themes, several developments emerged concerning the significance of social capital in determining a lawyer's success. One new development is the difference in the significance of professional and non-professional social capital networks for attorneys in small firms and those in large firms. Another development is further confirmation of the significance of mentorship among attorneys, and more specifically the finding that unofficial mentor relationships that develop "naturally" may be more beneficial than official mentor relationships assigned by law firms. The third and final major development in this study is the significance of membership in bridging and bonding voluntary organizations. There is evidence that involvement in these types of organizations helps with both client acquisition and mentor acquisition, and increases rapport and social support. Overall, these developments provide evidence that social capital is more about keeping a job than getting it. These findings will advance the scholarly understanding of the usefulness of social capital for attorneys.

The triangulation process of collecting interviews from attorneys in several different settings provided a saturated the sample with increased validity. Interviewing attorneys in both small and large firms highlighted two distinct points of emphasis for attorneys. Both sizes of firms have different needs and goals that the interviews revealed and clarified. The triangulation process also helped test the validity of the overarching themes of unofficial mentors and the significance of bridging and bonding organizations. These two overarching themes emerged in the interviews of each type of attorney in the sample across levels of experience, firm size, and race. After comparing the black and white attorneys in Iowa City, I found that the black attorney had a lower status range in his social network than the white attorney, however I cannot generalize this observation about racial differences in attorneys due to the small sample and the structural differences between this dual interview and the other interviews that I conducted. I did not find any support for the significance of bridging and bonding organizations in Troy's responses; he was not involved in any organizations, however, this is not evidence that these organizations are not beneficial, but rather that not everyone uses these organizations. The variety of attorneys in the sample strengthened the validity of the resulting themes because the attorneys had different perspectives. If experienced and inexperienced attorneys, as well as black and white attorneys, and those at large and small firms all believe it is important to have a mentor, that is more convincing than if only inexperienced attorneys at small firms asserted the importance of mentors. This multiple-perspective result allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the entire profession, which will facilitate more accurate theoretical development.

Client acquisition is essential for the success of small firm, little experience attorneys, whereas closeness with important partners is essential for large firm, little experience attorneys to be successful. The implications of this finding are that attorneys in small firms need to focus on increasing the size and status range of their overall social networks including, professional, non-professional, family, and volunteer organizations. Expanding their social networks will increase small firm, little experience attorneys' ability to obtain clients. Attorneys in large firms, in contrast, need to focus primarily on the status range of their professional social capital networks in order to gain access to the "important" partners. With regard to achieving closeness

to partners, the interviews demonstrated the importance of the following components: personal likeability, competence and skill, and having things in common with the partner (i.e., homophily). These three components can strongly influence whether or not an associate will gain access to a particular partner. For example, Patrice had a likeable and positive personality, and explained that she got along well with everyone. She also had a strong alumni network, which created a connection to a few of the partners in her firm. As a result, Patrice obtained consistent work and billable hours from the partners. In a second example, Keith was assigned a formal mentor, but was closer to his informal mentor because of their shared interest in politics; Keith's experience shows that having a common interest may be more beneficial for the development of a productive partner-associate relationship. Elise also explained that partners want to work with a mentee who has a common interest such having as the same alma mater, attending the same church, or looking the same. This link of commonality between partner and associate is how some of the minority lawyers in the sample perceived what it takes to be close to the partners. In order to get ahead by using social resources it may be important to use shared group affiliations and characteristics, but the research shows that it is also beneficial to obtain social resources through shared interests. This is further evidence that policy should emphasize establishing shared interests (beyond race, class, religion, and gender) between mentors and protégés.

Being connected to non-professional social capital networks such as family members and friends, and voluntary associations such as churches, neighborhood watches, or bar associations, all help associates attain clients. In this case study, Amy had a high status range in her personal networks and recounted a specific instance in which that helped her attain a client. I cannot conclude that black small firm, little experience attorneys, in general, have lower status ranges than white small firm, little experience attorneys using the current data; however, this conclusion

would be in line with research showing that blacks, in general, have smaller networks and a lower status range than whites (Korenmann and Turner 1996; McPherson et al. 2006). This study provides support for the economic implications of these differences in social networks, because lower status social networks reduce the ability of small firm, little experience attorneys to acquire clients—an ability that is essential their financial success.

The current study also highlights the importance of the development of a relationship with an informal mentor, either within or outside the associate's firm. The current research has shown that both status range and organizational affiliation influence the acquisition of unofficial mentors. Being connected to higher status individuals facilitates connections to higher status mentors, which leads to increased professional development and guidance. Future research should outline the differing importance of professional, non-professional, and family social capital networks in obtaining unofficial mentors, and should compare the different types of unofficial mentors, including those within and outside the firm. Mentors within the firm typically play the role of a close partner from whom to get billable hours. Mentors outside the firm cannot play that role, but do introduce clients to new social networks and provide candid career advice. Successfully connecting with a mentor outside the firm also seems to be predicated on the size and range of an associate's social network. Finally, the study revealed the benefits of being connected to voluntary organizations. Bridging organizations help create connections that facilitate career development, such as client and mentor acquisition. Bonding organizations create a sense of closeness and support that an associate may need to cope with the stresses of the job. Each of these new developments is a significant contribution to the research on the effects of social capital on a lawyer's success. These data also lend insight into findings from Chapter 2. It is clear from these data that gathering a large number of clients do not directly increase salary.

Other factors such as the prestige of the firm, and the type of clients brought in are much more significant determinants of salary. Keith, for example, earned a salary of \$350,000, far more than Amy, yet Keith only acquired one client last year. Also, this research provides some clarification on the significance of voluntary organizations for attorneys. As we have seen, organizational involvement can help attorneys obtain advice on specific issues and acquire clientele. Melvin avidly used the Inns of Court to discuss issues with other attorneys. Paul described how sitting on "boards" is a good way to acquire a new client. These actions do not directly affect income, yet they do aid in overall success.

Finally, these results illuminate the significance of non-professional social capital in determining clientele where the quantitative results showed little effects. As Amy explained, she was able to acquire clients through her personal social ties from her father's connections, and people from her neighborhood. The questions from the AJD could not bring this out because of the nature of the questions and the different types of lawyers analyzed. The interview data bring this concept to light by isolating the two lawyers in small private firms with in-depth questions. Overall, the interview data has further supported the significance of professional social capital and clarified the significance of informal social capital where the AJD could not.

#### **CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS**

The results of this study improve our understanding of the effect of social capital on job success within the legal profession and beyond. In this final chapter I will summarize the study's findings, theorize about their broader implications to decrease economic inequality, and discuss their limitations. The findings reveal the positive effect of social capital on salary, the white advantage over blacks in levels of social capital (even in this relatively elite labor market), and insight on how social capital develops within the office. This study also contributes to creating a clearer specification of social capital and its measurement. After dividing the analysis of social capital into three distinct networks - professional, non-professional, and family - we now have a better understanding of which specific network is most beneficial for economic gain and job satisfaction. Social capital in professional social networks indirectly increases salary in attorneys, while social capital in non-professional networks indirectly increases salary in attorneys through the acquisition of clientele. Professional social capital networks have also been shown to increase job satisfaction. There is good reason to believe that these findings could apply to other occupations that emphasize the importance of client acquisition.

This study's original research questions ask whether or not social capital affects salary and satisfaction, and if racial differences in social capital account for some of the white advantage in salary and job satisfaction for attorneys. The quantitative and qualitative sections of the study answer these questions in two different ways. The quantitative section uses a representative survey dataset to show correlations between social capital and salary. I found evidence that social capital is significant in obtaining economic success. As expected, eating meals with partners lead to a financial gain. Those who used colleagues to gain networking opportunities were more likely have a lower salary in private firms only. Also, using alumni networks increased an individual's likelihood to work in the more lucrative private sector. The qualitative section analyzed interview data in which lawyers described their experiences on the job as well as their social networks. Social capital emerged as a significant factor in achieving success as an attorney. Client acquisition was primarily important in small firms, mentoring emerged to be significant in increasing job satisfaction and salary at all levels of experience and firm size. The interviews provide descriptions of how social capital is used while the survey data express the effectiveness of using social capital.

#### Insight into Survey Questions from the AJD

The mixed methods nature of this study meant that I was able to learn a great deal about the quality of the five questions in the interview that were taken from the AJD questionnaire. First, the questions asking, "how many clients did you bring in?" and, "how much revenue did you generate from these clients?" did not produce much usable data in the qualitative interviews. On rare occasions, an interviewee did say that they brought in a client, but as explained, low experienced attorneys in large law firms were not responsible for bringing in clients. Also, the two attorneys in small firms did not know their exact client totals. As for the high experience partners who did bring in clients the number of clients were 1-3 because the clients were large corporations. Nobody knew the revenue numbers but they were recorded in their employee records. This question on the AJD does not do what I originally thought it did, which was to examine the client's ability to access their personal social networks, because many attorneys cannot provide an accurate answer. Instead, data like these, unless they are tied directly to records from the employer, should be seen as at best a rough estimate of their history of client acquisition.

The question asking if "you would like to see more or better mentoring from senior associates/partners" also provided insight into the quantitative data. The overwhelming majority of my sample answered yes to that question. This was true even if they related positive mentoring stories. They also explained that there is a large problem of proper mentoring that everyone is aware of but no one knows how to solve. These explanations highlight the significance of mentoring relationships amongst attorneys, but also highlight that an affirmative answer to that question on a survey does not necessarily indicate that the respondent has had little mentoring. Even when they had a satisfactory mentoring, attorneys seemed to have wanted more guidance in their profession.

The question asking, "what do you believe was the most significant factor in getting your job offer?" was quite intriguing because on the AJD there were several options but I left the question open ended, and people seemed slightly shocked that I would ask them that. They seemed to not have expected this question. Perhaps this is because they assumed I would automatically accept that they got their job because of the legitimized selection process that people go through to get any job. On the positive side, all of the responses corresponded with some option on the AJD. For example, Keith's was response was, "I don't know, probably my JD from the University of Chicago." James on the other hand believed that it was his personality. Overall, the answers were similar to the AJD patterns.

The question asking, "how much recreational time do you spend with your peers" was also insightful. The offices of large firm employees typically have firm events, and they would go with peers there. Sometimes they would go with them to events outside of that as well. Keith was probably the least social with his peers having come into the field late and being significantly older than most of them. He explained that he would attend fundraiser events with them but not any other type of activity. Troy described going out with peers once a week. The qualitative responses showed that the quantitative responses reflect not only unstructured recreational time, but also time arranged by large firms and designed to create social connections among their employees. The last question, "If the choice were yours how much longer would you stay in your current position," I could not ask very often in reference to their position at the firm, because multiple attorneys had already left their firm position. Keith explained that he planned on staying unless he did not get his promotion within a year or got pulled away by a dream job. This response illustrates that these estimates of the time attorneys plan to stay are actually contingent on multiple possible outcomes.

#### **Implications of Social Capital and Future Directions**

Overall the findings show that social capital boosts the significant determinants of lawyer success differently depending on the firm type. Both methods together reveal that professional social capital is effective to increase income and has different levels in whites than blacks. They show that low status individuals who establish positive relationships with higher status individuals establish social capital with them; affinity and trust develops with the other, which leads to favor in gaining work opportunities. Work opportunities include involvement in projects with clients that allow for billable hours and relevant experience. The overall evidence suggests that professional social capital would be useful in almost any white-collar profession because higher status individuals within any profession tend to have a large amount of influence on the success of the lower status employee. The evidence for non-professional social capital, on the other hand, can primarily be generalized only to other client-based professions. This is true because the acquisition of non-professional contacts are more relevant in these types of professions due to

their ability to become clients. For example, a private practice physician who is well connected in the community is more likely to have individuals seek them out for health care, just as the well-connected attorneys in this sample were sought out by their non-professional contacts.

Two distinct types of professional social capital emerge that are worth distinguishing: 1) outside office professional social capital, and 2) within office professional social capital. Within office professional social capital comes strictly from individuals within the company including associates, partners, and directors. Outside office professional social capital includes any contact that works in any part of the profession and does not work in the same office. For example, a tie to an attorney who works in another firm is outer office professional social capital. This research shows that both are beneficial in different ways. Outside office professional social capital is beneficial to individuals because it allows for career advice that contributes to professional development as well as access to other contacts that expand one's network and provide advice that is not specific to the firm or constrained by the interests of the firm. Using these contacts and outside professional social capital contacts can lead to the acquisition of higher status occupations. Within office professional social capital has the exact same advantages as outside office professional social capital, the only difference is that this form of social capital creates an economic advantage for employees because mentors within the firm have the power to create opportunities for financial gain within the office as well as outside. Non-professional social capital and voluntary group association membership benefits attorneys indirectly through the acquisition of clients. I argue that non-professional social capital can increase clientele acquisition in any occupation that requires client acquisition. This type of social capital appears to be less significant in financial attainment on the job. Family social capital also appears to have little to no effect on financial attainment. Although this study found little support for the benefits

for these forms of social capital, it was severely limited by its ability to measure non-professional and family social capital. There is some evidence that professional social capital increased job satisfaction, and that blacks who use family ties are likely to be less satisfied, but the evidence is not strong enough for me to make definitive conclusions.

This study found that the most significant factor in establishing effective social capital is their connection to high status ties. Being associated with high status individuals within one's profession leads to a higher salary and job satisfaction. Blacks are less likely to be associated with high status individuals within their firm even controlling for firm socioeconomic status and law school GPA. This implies that Blacks should develop more ties to high status individuals inside their offices. The research describes one common type of relationship that developed between high and low status workers on the job and that is the mentor/protégé relationship. This relationship is one in which the mentor guides the protégé in career choices and professional development to learn how to be successful on the job. This relationship appears to be highly significant for career development. One might argue that individuals of the same race and social class will be more likely to want to associate with one another and therefore there is little chance that high status white individuals will naturally develop a relationship with a lower status minority. There are other similarities that could be emphasized, however, while race is deemphasized in order to increase this likelihood of developing mentoring relationships within an occupation. For example, Keith, a black male, explained that him and his white male mentor were both interested in establishing political careers at some point, and this similarity fostered there mentor-protégé relationship. He explained that they did not even share the same political ideologies, yet this shared desire to be involved in politics was the common characteristic needed for the relationship to grow. This study contributes to the theory of social capital by showing a

common link with a superior can establish a productive mentor/protégé relationship. Establishing this type of relationship can lead to an increased salary through mentor advocacy in the occupation and career guidance.

The biggest question underlying social capital connections in occupations is why would a high status individual want to share their resources with lower status individuals? In other words, what is in it for them? There are psychological advantages for those who become mentors. Research shows that those who are mentors are more likely to be satisfied in their occupations and to remain there (Johnson et al. 2001). Mentors also benefit from supporting their protégés because it confirms their own abilities in their field as well as their ability to teach those skills. It provides intrinsic satisfaction because of the feeling of helping another and extrinsic satisfaction because it increases respect and admiration from others. The current research has shown that partners in large firms assign work to their protégés. Having a trustworthy and competent protégé could benefit the mentor in creating a high quality efficient product service to clients. Zey (1984) found evidence for these benefits of being a mentor in his interviews of one hundred executives. More research must examine other possible benefits to becoming a mentor, because it is at least equally important that high status people have a desire to develop relationships with low status individuals. The benefits for the low status individuals are obvious, yet this relationship cannot be completely one-sided. Low status individuals must be able to benefit high status individuals in a tangible way. If this does not take place, the high status individual will have no incentive to carry these relationships out. I have already explained a few ways in which high status individuals may benefit from this relationship, yet more are needed.

The current study also expands social capital theory by highlighting professional social capital as a specific type of social network in which a relationship with high status individuals

can increase salary. Theories about the effect of social capital on occupational success have shown that social ties can increase an individual's wages on that job. Granovetter's (1973) classic study describes the significance of weak ties in increasing the flow of information within an individuals' social network. This study supports the ability of social capital to increase wages for those who have a broad set of weak ties. The current research project illustrates the positive effects of using weak ties in getting jobs because the results show that using an alumni association to get a job makes the attorney more likely to work in the private sector. It expounds on this theory by showing the benefits of having social ties, specifically in their profession. It shifts the focus from the use of social capital in getting a job to showing the ability of social capital to provide success while on the job. This research also corroborates general findings that blacks' social networks have lower levels of size and range than whites (Marsden 1987; Marsden and Hulbert 1988; Tigges et al. 1998; McPherson et al. 2006). Increasing the size and status range of professional social capital networks will help to narrow the black-white racial gap in salary because of the relationship of professional social capital with salary.

This research applies social capital theory by exploring ways to increase the amount of black professional social capital. The way to increase this social capital is by finding similarities with high status others beyond race and gender. The next step in the research process is to find ways to increase these similarities. Future research should explore ways to increase the diversity in social network range in a broader sense. The current study shows that individuals with low occupational prestige benefit from interacting with individuals with high occupational prestige. In expanding this concept, I would like to research ways to integrate individuals with low socioeconomic status with individuals with high socioeconomic status in occupations, neighborhoods, school, and other social institutions. This dissertation provides some insight on where to begin exploring the increase in network status diversity. One aspect that can increase this network status diversity is to implement programs with an emphasis on establishing similarities amongst individuals. The interview data reveal the significance of establishing similarities with high status individuals to establish and create the foundation of these relationships. These similarities must go beyond racial/ethnic, gender, and religious similarities. These are the similarities primarily described by the homophily theory. Similarities such as interests within occupation, hobbies and personality types should be examined to see if they could establish a foundation for these mentoring relationships. Also, mentoring programs must highlight the significance of the psychological advantages of mentoring as well as create economic incentives for them.

This study uses multiple methods and multiple measures of social capital to test its effect on lawyer success. However, there are some limitations within the AJD and interview format that restrict the methods from perfectly testing this relationship. Within the AJD the primary limitation is that the data are self-reported. Some of the questions used to measure the use of social capital reflect the individual's perception of how much they used particular social relationships in their profession. This is not necessarily the same concept as the actual helpfulness of social capital. This may bias the results with misperceptions from the participants. For example, the data rely in part on questions that ask how helpful several aspects of their social networks were in obtaining their first job and in specific areas of their job. I have no way to determine how much social capital and non-social capital variables actually aided them in their success except for what the participants self-report. This is problematic because participants may perceive certain social aspects to be helpful when they were not or overlook the helpfulness of other aspects. However, individuals should know when a social relationship directly benefitted them in a particular situation, therefore the study benefits from the measure, and it provides a comparison with the interview results. The data also include other, more direct measures of social capital such as the amount of socializing that the respondents do with senior partners. While these measures better capture the concept, they still do not perfectly measure the ability to convert these social connections into meaningful resources. Secondly, the dataset lacks questions examining detailed characteristics of their social networks and the bridging/bonding nature of the organizations to which they belong. I asked questions assessing this concept during the interviews.

As with most qualitative research, the qualitative data have a small sample size that is not representative of the larger lawyer population. With only nine white lawyers from two cities, the goal is not to provide a representative description but rather a description of these specific case studies. Self-reported data is still the main limitation of the data in this study. The mixed methods have many other strengths, however it cannot overcome this limitation. This study also has limitations that prohibit it from making a causal argument for the effect of social capital on job success. The study has successfully satisfied two of the three necessary components to infer causation because it can test for co-variation and temporality. The quantitative component of this study examines how social capital is related to, and precedes, job success. However this study still cannot account for every possible spurious variable that may be causing both increased social capital and income. The quantitative section controls for several possible spurious variables including class, gender, and homophily, by status of the firm, but there may be other variables unaccounted for. The qualitative section allowed for a thick description of the effect of social capital on job success but may suffer from inaccuracies due to self-report bias and may not be representative of the entire lawyer population. The only way to

fully establish causation is by randomly sampling individuals into a controlled environment, which is not possible in this case.

In summary, this project increases our understanding of the significance of social capital in increasing salary and job satisfaction. It provides evidence that positive contact with those in higher status positions within the profession leads to an increase in salary amongst all types of lawyers, but for different reasons for those in large and small firms. It increases our understanding of the significance of the entire social capital network beyond the professional environment. We now have a better understanding of the role of nonprofessional social capital in increasing client acquisition in client driven professions. Future studies should continue to examine the significance of nonprofessional social capital in acquiring clients with improved measures.

This study also improves our understanding of the role of social capital in determining racial differences in job success. Blacks are less connected to high status contacts than whites, and this contributes to their lower average levels of income within the occupation. Blacks are also less likely to work in the private sector than whites, and the contacts that blacks use to acquire their jobs contribute to this lower likelihood of working in the private sector. The results suggest that increasing connections with high status contacts can increase the likelihood of working in the higher paying sector. It will also increase the salary once in this high paying sector. These connections are often established in mentoring relationships. Mentor-protégé relationships help to decrease income disparities by increasing status integration. Social capital helps us understand, therefore, some of the important mechanisms that can produce inequality within a high-status client-driven profession, as well as possible methods of reducing that inequality.

# APPENDIX A: HYPOTHESES

# Table A. 1. Hypotheses

| Hypothesis 1a | High levels of professional and non-professional social capital are correlated with personally bringing in a greater number of new clients.   |
|---------------|---|
| Hypothesis 1b | Bringing in a greater number of clients is correlated with higher earnings for lawyers.   |
| Hypothesis 1c | High levels of professional and non-professional social capital are correlated<br>with higher overall earnings, which is partly explained by the positive<br>correlation between social capital and the number of new clients recruited by<br>the lawyer. |
| Hypothesis 2a | Blacks who use social capital more will have <i>larger</i> positive earnings gains over black peers, compared to the earnings gains of whites who use social capital more than their peers.   |
| Hypothesis 2b | Blacks who use social capital more will have <i>smaller (or even negative)</i> earnings gains over black peers, compared to the earnings gains of whites who use soci capital more than their peers.  |
| Hypothesis 3  | Lawyers involved in large voluntary organizations will have higher earnings than those who are not.   |
| Hypothesis 4  | Blacks who used social contacts extensively are more likely to work in public sector jobs than whites who used social contacts extensively.   |
| Hypothesis 5  | High levels of professional and non-professional social capital on the job are correlated with high levels of job satisfaction.   |
| Hypothesis 6  | High levels of kinship social capital and emotionally supportive professional social capital in lawyers are correlated with high levels of job satisfaction.  |
| Hypothesis 7a | Blacks with higher levels of kinship support will have <i>larger</i> job satisfaction gains over their peers, compared to whites with higher rates of kinship support than their peers.   |

### APPENDIX B: JOB SATISFACTION COMPOSITE VARIABLE MEAUSURE

| Level of responsibility you have                                   |
|--|
|  |
| Recognition you receive for your work                              |
| Substantive area of your work                                      |
| Tasks you perform  |
| Opportunities for advancement                                      |
| Compensation (including salary, benefits and bonus, if applicable) |
| Control you have over the amount of work you do                    |
| Control you have over how you do your work                         |
| Relationships with colleagues                                      |
| Opportunities for doing pro bono work                              |
| Intellectual challenge of your work                                |
| Opportunities for building skills                                  |
| Amount of travel required  |
| Diversity of the workplace   |
| Performance evaluation process                                     |
| Value of your work to society                                      |
| Job security   |

 Table B.1. Job Satisfaction Composite Variable Measure

Note: The question asks, "How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your current position?" Participants answer on a scale of 1-7 for each aspect of their job, where 1 represents highly dissatisfied, and 7 represents highly satisfied.

# APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TABLES

| Wave II                    |         |           |         |           |
|----------------------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
|                            | White   |           | Black   |           |
|                            | Percent | Frequency | Percent | Frequency |
| 0-5 Lawyers in Office      | 18.35   | 147       | 14      | 7         |
| 6-10 Lawyers in Office     | 11.49   | 92        | 6       | 3         |
| 11-25 Lawyers in Office    | 16.73   | 134       | 14      | 7         |
| 26-50 Lawyers in Office    | 15.73   | 126       | 18      | 9         |
| 51-100 Lawyers in Office   | 14.61   | 117       | 16      | 8         |
| Over 100 Lawyers in Office | 23.1    | 185       | 32      | 16        |
| Total                      | 100     | 801       | 100     | 50        |
|                            |         |           |         |           |
| Wave I                     |         |           |         |           |
|                            | White   |           | Black   |           |
|                            | Percent | Frequency | Percent | Frequency |
| 0-5 Lawyers in Office      | 15.27   | 129       | 12.5    | 7         |
| 6-10 Lawyers in Office     | 9.7     | 82        | 7.14    | 4         |
| 11-25 Lawyers in Office    | 13.14   | 111       | 14.29   | 8         |
| 26-50 Lawyers in Office    | 9.94    | 84        | 3.57    | 2         |
| 51-100 Lawyers in Office   | 9.82    | 83        | 10.71   | 6         |
| Over 100 Lawyers in Office | 42.14   | 356       | 51.78   | 29        |
| Total                      | 100     | 845       | 100     | 50        |

## Table C.1: Categories of Size of Private Firms

| Trivate Timi Attorneys (Supplementary)             |          |          |  |
|--|----------|----------|--|
|  | Model 1  | Model 2  |  |
| Job Rewards  |          |          |  |
| Would Like a greater opportunity to make decisions |          | -0.238+  |  |
|  |          | (0.125)  |  |
| Would like a greater opportunity to shape future   |          | -0.078   |  |
|  |          | (0.163)  |  |
| Professional Social Capital                        |          |          |  |
| Meal with Partner                                  | 0.155    | 0.154    |  |
|  | (0.106)  | (0.166)  |  |
| Recreation with Associates                         | -0.0713  | -0.128   |  |
|  | (0.108)  | (0.168)  |  |
| More Mentoring                                     | -0.207*  | -0.239   |  |
|  | (0.102)  | (0.154)  |  |
| Controls   |          |          |  |
| Male   |          | -0.157   |  |
|  |          | (0.149)  |  |
| Lawyers in Office                                  |          | -0.045** |  |
|  |          | (0.016)  |  |
| GPA in Law school                                  |          | 0.604*** |  |
|  |          | (0.258)  |  |
| Black  | -0.177   | 0.0966   |  |
|  | (0.199)  | (0.414)  |  |
| Blacks who Want More Mentoring                     |          | 0.112    |  |
|  |          | (0.733)  |  |
| Constant   | 5.347*** | 3.618*** |  |
|  | (0.131)  | (0.592)  |  |
|  | · · · ·  |          |  |
| Observations                                       | 367      | 367      |  |
| R-squared  | 0.023    | 0.079    |  |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses               |          |          |  |

**Table C.2.** OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital on Job Satisfaction for Private Firm Attorneys (Supplementary)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\*significant at 1%; \*\*\*significant at 0.1%

|                                    | Model 1   | Model 2   |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Monthly Group Activities           | 12.124*** | 9.688***  |
|                                    | (2.886)   | (2.946)   |
| Black                              |           | 0.714     |
|                                    |           | (34.73)   |
| Blacks in Monthly Group Activities |           | -11.72    |
|                                    |           | (40.20)   |
| Male                               |           | 11.249*** |
|                                    |           | (2.904)   |
| Lawyers in Office                  |           | -2.512*** |
|                                    |           | (0.425)   |
| Law GPA                            |           | -3.661    |
|                                    |           | (3.991)   |
| Constant                           | 6.469***  | 25.108+   |
|                                    | (1.879)   | (13.362)  |
| Observations                       |           |           |
| R-Squared                          | 802       | 802       |
| Standard errors in parentheses     | 0.022     | 0.088     |

**Table C.3.** Hypothesis 3: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Involvement in Large Organizations on Number of Clients

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* Significant at 5%; \*\*Significant at 1%; \*\*\*Significant at 0.1%

| Race  | Model 1   | Model 2   |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| Black                                       | -13.201   | -25.771   |
|   | (17.302)  | (52.061)  |
| Non-Professional Social Capital             |           |           |
| Participates in Monthly Group Activities    | 16.511*** | 14.113*** |
|   | (4.254)   | (4.245)   |
| Informal Networks Established Connections   | -0.918    | 6.983     |
|   | (9.027)   | (15.521)  |
| Non-lawyer Contacts Established Connections | 4.364     | -1.822    |
|   | (9.719)   | (17.366)  |
| Professional Social Capital                 |           |           |
| Meal with Partner                           | 5.689     | -14.281   |
|   | (7.651)   | (13.103)  |
| Recreation with Partner                     | 4.335     | 16.654    |
|   | (7.276)   | (11.993)  |
| Recreation with Associates                  | -9.918    | -4.465    |
|   | (7.124)   | (4.624)   |
| More Mentoring                              | -8.830    | -15.952   |
|   | (6.567)   | (11.211)  |
| Controls                                    |           |           |
| Male  |           | 9.705*    |
|   |           | (4.219)   |
| Lawyers in Office                           |           | -1.519*   |
|   |           | (0.681)   |
| GPA in Law school                           |           | -13.434*  |
|   |           | (7.287)   |
| Constant                                    | 7.392     | 57.562*   |
|   | (5.765)   | (24.851)  |
| Observations                                | 325       | 325       |
| R-Squared                                   | 0.069     | 0.113     |

**Table C.4.** Hypothesis1A: OLS Regression Model for the Effect of Social Capital on Number of Clients with Voluntary Organizations (Private Firms Only)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ Significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\*significant at 1%; \*\*\*significant at 0.1%
## APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Introductory statement to network questions: I am going to ask you some questions about a hypothetical event as a way of mapping some of the most important people in your social network.<sup>21</sup>

- Imagine that you won an award that you are very excited about and the organization that is giving you the award is throwing a party in your honor. Thinking carefully about the people you want to share this evening with, who would you invite? Assume that travel and distance are not an issue."
- Caterers often find that it is easiest to seat people at functions like these if the guest of honor provides categories for the guests. Please categorize your guests in the most meaningful way that you can.
  - a. How close do you feel to the people on your guest list?
  - b. Describe the education and occupational status of those on your list.
- We are interested in which of the people on your guest list know each other. For each pair of guests, please indicate those that know each other *well enough to*

## stop and chat if they passed each other on the street.

- 4) Describe a typical day on the job.
- 5) Who do you go to for advice
  - a. What are those people's characteristics?
  - b. Do they know each other?
- 6) Describe the personal characteristics or external resources necessary to get promoted and increased salary at your job.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> A \* next to a question indicates that this question also appears on the AJD.

- a. Describe the reasons the most successful people in your firm/office have gotten to their position.
- 7) Describe the relationship between you and your peers.
  - a. Describe the mentoring relationships at your office at your office.
  - b. Do you have a formal mentor? Do you have an informal mentor? How much do you trust them?
  - c. How much do they support you emotionally? Substantively?
  - d. Would you like to see more or better mentoring by senior attorneys? \*If so, why? What types of mentoring would you like to see?
- 8) Do you join senior attorneys for meals? Do you spend recreational time with senior attorneys?\*
- 9) Do you spend recreational time with attorneys who are peers? \*
- 10) Describe the voluntary clubs/organizations that you are involved in.
  - 5a) How similar or different to you are the people in this organization?
  - 5b) How much do you trust members of your organization?
  - 5c) How much do they support you emotionally? Substantively?
- 11) How many clients did you personally bring in last year?\*
  - 7a) Describe the process through which you acquired these clients.
  - 7b) How much revenue did you bring in from clients last year?\*
- 12) What do you believe was the most significant factor in your current organization's decision to make you a job offer?\*

12a) Why?

13) If the decision were yours, how much longer would you stay with your current employer?\*

10a) Where would you go next? Why?

- 14) Overall, how satisfied are you with your current job?
- 15) Who was most influential in establishing your networking connections on your job?
- 16) Where did you get your JD?
- 17) What is your current salary?
- 18) Any additional comments or statements?

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